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THE PROBLEM WITH CONGRESS AND
COPYRIGHT LAW: FORGETTING THE PAST AND
IGNORING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Craig W. Dallon*
I. INTRODUCTION
The bedrock of copyright law in the United States is
found in the United States Constitution, Article I, section 8,
which states in relevant part that "[t]he Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '
Although the term "copyright" is never used, this provision of
the Constitution2 is commonly known as the Copyright
Clause.3 Since the ratification of the Constitution, the Copy-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law. My
thanks go to Jenna B. Taub and Alyson Keiser for their valuable research assis-
tance with this Article.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
2. Id.
3. The Copyright Clause is also referred to as the Intellectual Property
Clause because it is applicable to both copyrights and patents. See, e.g., United
States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (referring to
Intellectual Property Clause); Infodeck, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., 830
F. Supp. 614, 622 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (referring to Intellectual Property
Clause); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative
Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress,
2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1120 & n.2 (2000) (adopting the term "Intellectual
Property Clause"). Cases and other sources involving patents often refer to the
same clause as the Patent Clause. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35, (2001) (not reaching the Patent Clause issue);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 635-37 & n.4 (1999) (discussing and quoting the Patent Clause). The
clause is also referred to as the "Patent and Copyright Clause." See Karl Fen-
ning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17
GEO. L.J. 109, 111 (1928) (referring to the clause as the "Patent and Copyright
Clause"); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Consti-
tution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 19, 21 (2001) (referring
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right Clause has been the basis of Congress's power to enact
copyright laws protecting the rights of authors4 in their
works. Congress has exercised this power in a series of major
copyright laws beginning with the Copyright Act of 1790, fol-
lowed by the respective Acts of 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976.'
The current copyright law is the Copyright Act of 1976 ("the
1976 Act").6 In 1998, Congress amended the 1976 Act when it
passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
("CTEA"), which extended the terms of existing and future
copyrights by twenty years.7 The CTEA has provoked signifi-
cant litigation, culminating in Supreme Court review8 and ex-
tensive scholarly discussion concerning the purpose of copy-
right law and the power of Congress under the Copyright
Clause.9
Through the centuries, copyright law has developed and
adapted to changing conditions. In particular, new technol-
ogy has driven changes and advancement in copyright law.
The invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century
to the clause as the "Patent and Copyright Clause").
4. "Authors" as used here and in many other places in this Article, carries
the broad meaning applied by the current Copyright Act. The Copyright Act
defines "works of authorship" to include, among other things, literary works,
musical works, pictorial works, and motion pictures. Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
5. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1848); Copyright
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831); Copyright Act of Jul. 8, 1870, ch.
230, 16 Stat. 198 (1871); Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000). Through the years
there have been many other amendments to these major copyright laws.
6. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000). The 1976 Copy-
right Act now includes numerous amendments since its original enactment in
1976.
7. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998) (amending scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
8. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution:
"Have I Stayed Too Long "52 FLA. L. REV. 989 (2000) (arguing that CTEA's
retroactive extension violates the Copyright Clause); Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas
R. Lee, "To Promote the Progress of Science:" The Copyright Clause and Con-
gress's Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2002) (arguing
that CTEA is constitutional); Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1168-76 (arguing
that CTEA is inconsistent with the principles underlying the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause); Ochoa, supra note 3, at 19 (arguing that CTEA's indiscriminate
retroactive extension of existing copyrights is unconstitutional); Edward C. Wal-
terscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of
a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1 (2002) (discussing the meaning of the Copy-
right Clause and the limitation it imposes on congressional power).
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literally put in motion the machinery that precipitated copy-
right protection.10 Later, invention of the photograph, piano
roll, motion picture, voice recording, radio, television, copy
machine, video tape, computer, and the Internet each raised
new issues which forced reconsideration and adaptation of
copyright principles. Peer-to-peer file sharing, CDs, DVDs,
Internet streaming, and distance learning continue to chal-
lenge copyright principles.
Notwithstanding these advances in today's rapidly
changing technological environment, the original purposes of
the Copyright Clause remain relevant today; the Framers'
original intentions define the reach of the clause, and the
original purposes continue to make good sense.
As Congress and the judiciary tackle new issues in copy-
right law, they should reflect upon the scope of Congress's au-
thority as embodied in the Copyright Clause, bearing in mind
the values and purposes which led to inclusion of the clause
in the Constitution. When it passed the CTEA in 1998, Con-
gress either misunderstood or deliberately brushed aside the
primary rationale for copyright protection-the promotion of
the public good. Instead, Congress embraced a natural law-
based, property right rationale."
The utilitarian, or public benefit, rationale of copyright
law (the "public benefit rationale") suggests that copyright
protection exists to encourage the creation of works and pub-
lic access to those works. 2 According to this rationale, copy-
right law provides an incentive, in the form of a limited mo-
nopoly, for authors to create works." This limited monopoly
allows authors an opportunity to obtain adequate remunera-
tion for their works. The incentive is balanced against the
public's need for access to the work. Ultimately, after the lim-
ited monopoly has provided an adequate incentive, the mo-
10. See 1 HERBERT BROOM & EDWARD A. HADLEY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 794 (1875) (noting that before the era of printing the neces-
sity for copyright protection "was less, if at all, felt").
11. See infra Part V.C. (discussing the rationale for enacting CTEA).
12. For an explanation of this utilitarian view of copyright, see Alfred C.
Yen, Restoring the Natural Law. Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 517,517-18 (1990). See also Jane C. Ginsburg et al., The Constitutional-
ity of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long, 18 CARDOzO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 651, 675-76, 696 (2000) (referring to and discussing the "instrumental-
ist" or "incentive" rationale).
13. See Yen, supra note 12, at 517-18 (discussing the economic incentive
theory of copyright).
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nopoly ends; the work enters the "public domain" and is freely
available for public use. Thus, copyright is a grant or privi-
lege created by statute, which can then be altered and limited
by statute.
14
The competing theory of copyright law is a natural law-
based property theory ("property right rationale"). 5 Under
this view, by virtue of being the creator of a work, the author
has an inherent ownership right in the work. This view is of-
ten cloaked in a fairness argument. Because the author cre-
ated the work, it is only fair to afford the author control over
the work. Copyright is a recognition of this ownership or
property right without regard to incentives or public benefits.
To be sure, this natural law property right rationale has a
long pedigree and has influenced many lawmakers and ju-
rists.' 6 Nonetheless, the property right rationale traditionally
has been subordinate to the public benefit purpose manifest
in the express words of the Copyright Clause itself.7
In an effort to elucidate the rationale underlying the
Copyright Clause, Part II of this article looks back at the his-
torical roots of copyright prior to the Statute of Anne in 1710.
The article acknowledges glimmers of copyright law emanat-
ing from the Roman Empire, recognizes the impact of the in-
vention of the printing press on the development of copyright
law, and reviews the role of the Stationers' Company and the
stationers' copyright. Part III discusses the Statute of Anne
and the failed struggle for recognition of a perpetual common
law copyright that followed, while Part IV considers copyright
as it was conceived and developed in the United States. Part
V discusses the passage of the CTEA, and demonstrates that
Congress was influenced by the property right rationale at
the expense of the public interest.
14. See Dennis Harney, Note, Mickey Mousing the Copyright Clause of the
US Constitution: Eldred v. Reno, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 291, 308 (2002) (dis-
cussing generally the utilitarian theory and the limited grant of copyright).
15. For an explanation of this natural law view of copyright, see Yen, supra
note 12, at 522-24.
16. See infra notes 242-64, 347-48 and accompanying text (discussing early
support for property right rationale).
17. See generally infra notes 367-452 and accompanying text (discussing
recognition of public benefit rationale)
Vol: 44368
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II. LOOKING BACK TO THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF COPYRIGHT
LAW
A. Hints of Copyright Before the Printing Press
1. Roman LawAntecedents
Although the roots of American copyright law can be
traced back to England and the Statute of Anne enacted in
1710, the history of copyright law began much earlier. Ro-
man law neither recognized nor protected copyright inter-
ests,"8 but did recognize the foundational building blocks of
modern copyright law. 9
One such building block found in Roman law is mani-
fested in the understanding of ownership rights. According to
Roman law, ownership of property could be obtained through
accession (accessio)," where two things with independent ex-
istence were combined into one.2 By accession, the "accessory
thing" would merge into the "principal thing," and the owner
of the principal would be the owner of the single merged
"principal thing."22
An illustration of accession provided by Roman jurists
involved writing on someone else's parchment or paper or
18. See Russ VerSteeg, The Roman Law Roots of Copyright, 59 MD. L. REV.
522, 523 (2000) ("[I]t is virtually certain that the ancient Romans did not have a
general law of copyright .... "); see also JOHN CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME
207 (1967) ("There was no law of patent or copyright, no protection for property
in ideas."); Brander Matthews, The Evolution of Copyight, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 583,
586 (1890) ("In Rome ... we find no trace of copyright or of anything like it.").
19. See VerSteeg, supra note 18, at 530-53 (discussing Roman law recogni-
tion of principles underlying copyright law such as intangible personal property,
property dedicated to public use, types of works of authorship, transfers of in-
tangibles, and joint authorship).
20. See 2 CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD
202 (1917) (listing six modes of acquiring ownership of single things).
21. See id. at 207 (stating that "accession occurs when a thing previously
having an independent existence becomes an actual part of another thing").
22. See W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO
JUSTINIAN 210 (1921) (discussing accession). The test for which thing was the
"principal thing" was based on the relative importance of the objects, but some-
times was also based on value. See SHERMAN, supra note 20, at 209 (stating
that "generally the less important is to be considered the accessory thing, and
the more important the principal thing"); MAx RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN
LAW § 130, at 349 (1927) (stating that the test was based on importance, but
sometimes was based merely on value); BUCKLAND, supra, at 210 (preferring an
identity test over relative value test).
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painting on someone else's canvas or wood.23 The Institutes of
Justinian discusses the following examples:
Writing, again, even though it be in gold lettering, accedes
to the paper or vellum in the same way that buildings ac-
cede to the land or the seeds planted therein. Thus, if Ti-
tius write a song or narrative on your paper or vellum, not
Titius but you will be regarded as the owner thereof....
If one person paint on another's board, there are some who
think that the board accedes to the picture while others
hold that the picture, whatever it be, accedes to the board.
To us, however, it appears preferable that the board ac-
cede to the painting: for it is absurd that a painting by
24.5Apelles or Parrhasius 25 should, by accession, become part
of a cheap board.26
These explanations do not address the existence or ownership
of an author's copyright but instead appear to be limited to
the necessary issue of ultimate ownership of the object in
which a work is fixed. The discussion is significant, however,
because it demonstrates the Roman law understanding that
authors and artists have, at least initially, property right in
their works separate from the objects in which those works
are fixed.27 It further demonstrates that those rights, in the
case of an artist, may be so significant that they are superior
to the rights of the owner of the canvas or wood on which the
painting is fixed. 8 This distinction between an author's
23. Professor Sherman identified this form of accession as "adjunction."
SHERMAN, supra note 20, at 209-10.
24. Apelles was a celebrated Greek painter who lived around 330 B.C. THE
COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 128 (2000). None of his works survived. Id.
25. Parrhasius was also a famous Greek painter who lived around 400 B.C.
Id. at 2154. None of his works survived. Id.
26. J. INST. 2.1.33-34 (JAC Thomas trans., 1975) (footnotes added).
27. See VerSteeg, supra note 18, at 537 (stating that the Romans appreci-
ated "the concept that there is a significant distinction between an underlying
artistic work and the physical object in which that work is embodied"). Admit-
tedly, there is ambiguity in the discussion as viewed in our modern context. It
appears that the Roman scholars were focused in part on the ownership of the
physical materials actually placed on the paper rather than the intangible value
to the words themselves as suggested by the remark "though it be in gold letter-
ing." J. INST., supra note 26, at 2.1.33. But it is equally apparent that the
scholars had in mind more than merely the physical materials added, as evi-
denced by the reference to the value of paintings by famous Greek painters. See
id. at 2.1.34 (stating "for it is absurd that a painting by Apelles or Parrhasius
should, by accession, become part of a cheap board").
28. Justinian's Institute appears to apply a value test to paintings. See
RADIN, supra note 22, at 351 (stating that in case of paintings on wood, value
370 Vol: 44
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rights in a work of authorship and an owner's rights in the
object in which the work is fixed is a fundamental principle of
copyright law.' 9
The Romans recognized the value of an author's manu-
script, and, in at least some cases, booksellers paid authors
for their works.3" Wealthy people and booksellers had trained
slaves or hired copyists who transcribed manuscripts to cre-
ate copies for sale." In his Commentaries on the Law of Eng-
land, William Blackstone confirms that "the sale of literary
copies, for the purposes of recital or multiplication, is cer-
was the test). The value of the artist's work may exceed the value of the wood
on which it was placed so that the wood should belong to the artist. See
BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 211. Roman law considered the good faith of the
parties and provided compensation for the party whose property was acceded.
See J. INST., supra note 26, at 2.1.33-34 (considering good faith of writer and
painter, acknowledging right to compensation); 2 SHERMAN, supra note 20, at
209 ("But the person ignorantly uniting another's property to his own must
compensate the owner of the property so adjoined; but if he did this with evil
intent, he is liable for theft.").
29. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) (distinguishing own-
ership of copyright from ownership of material object); Stephens v. Cady, 55
U.S. 528, 530 (1852) (holding that copyright exists separately from the object in
which it is fixed); Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Soc'y, 39 N.E.2d 249, 250-51 (N.Y.
1942) (reaffirming "that the ownership of the painting itself does not necessarily
carry with it the common law copyright;" copyright was "a different and inde-
pendent right from the usual right of ownership of an article of personal prop-
erty).
30. According to George Putnam, "under the Roman Empire authors were in
the habit of transferring to booksellers, for such consideration as they could ob-
tain, the right to duplicate and to sell their works, and that, under the trade us-
ages, they were protected in so doing." George Haven Putnam, Literary Prop-
erty: An Historical Sketch, in CYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (Mason &
Lalor eds., 1884), reprinted in THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT 35, 40 ( 3d ed.
1904); accord RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS
LAWS 8 (1921) (speaking of Roman times, concluding "it is probable that some
kind of payment was made to authors"); HARRY Y. GAMBLE, BOOKS AND
READERS IN THE EARLY CHURCH: A HISTORY OF EARLY CHRISTIAN TEXTS 87
(1995) (discussing Roman times, stating that in cases where the author was
paid, payment was probably a flat fee); cf PHILIP WITTENBERG, THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY PROPERTY 5 (rev. ed. 1978) ("There were books in a
steady stream and the booksellers and publishers copied whatever they wished
without so much as a by-your-leave to the author; there were some cases where
out of moral consideration, or perhaps because the author withheld his manu-
script, the publisher paid a price.").
31. See GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 85 (discussing use of trained slaves and
professional scribes). WITTENBERG, supra note 30, at 4 (discussing a mass pub-
lishing business with a large number of trained slaves who took dictation from a
reader and could produce a thousand copies of a small volume in a day); Put-
nam, supra note 30, at 39.
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tainly as antient [sic] as the times of Terence,32 Martial,3 and
Statius.34,3 5 Still, there was no copyright as such and no pro-
tection against piracy.36 At best, an author received some
compensation for the original manuscript, but once the
manuscript was sold or given away, it could be freely copied
without any limits placed by the author and without any
compensation to the author. 7
2. Jewish Law Tradition: Copying Texts and Right of
Attribution
Like Roman law, Jewish law also had some basic princi-
ples that foreshadowed the later development of copyright
law. Jewish law endorsed and even commanded the faithful
reproduction of scriptural and other texts.3 ' This principle is
significant for two reasons. First, it permitted and encour-
aged the copying of texts, 9 which required recognition of what
32. Terence was a Roman writer of comedies who lived from about 195 B.C.
to 159 B.C. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 24, at 2814; see also
Putnam, supra note 30, at 39 (documenting sales of two of Terence's works).
33. Martial was a Roman epigrammatic poet who lived from about 40 A.D.
to 104 A.D. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 24, at 1766; see also
Putnam, supra note 30, at 39 (discussing Martial's relationship with his pub-
lishers and complaining about the high prices the bookseller charged for his
work Xeni).
34. Statius was an esteemed Latin poet who lived from about 45 A.D. to 96
A.D. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 24, at 2707; see also Put-
nam, supra note 30, at 40 (noting report "that Statius would have starved if he
had not succeeded in selling to the actor Paris his tragedy of Agave).
35. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 406 (2d ed. 1767) (foot-
notes added).
36. See WITTENBERG, supra note 30, at 5 (noting no protection against pi-
racy and "no notion of copyright").
37. See GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 83 ("No author in antiquity had a signifi-
cant financial interest in the sale of what he or she wrote, for there was no ar-
rangement whereby profits accrued to an author through the enterprise of pub-
lishers and booksellers."); id. at 84-85 (discussing how copies were in turn
copied, beyond the control of the author).
38. See David Nimmer, Adams and Bits: Of Jewish Kings and Copyrights,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 219, 231 (1998) (discussing Torah and citing Deut. 17:18-20);
Samuel J. Petuchowski, Toward a Conceptual Basis for the Protection of Liter-
ary Product in a Post-Printing Era: Precedents in Jewish Law, 3 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 48-49 (1994) (noting that following the first century and
the dispersal of much of the Palestinian Jewish community, "[t]he study of writ-
ten texts thus became one of the foundations of cultural survival," and "the
Rabbis actually encouraged the primary infringing activity of today's copyright
regimes, namely, copying").
39. See Petuchowski, supra note 38, at 48-49 (stating that Rabbis encour-
aged copying).
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now might be called the "public domain., 4' This copying was
necessary to facilitate broad dissemination of Jewish law and
tradition for the benefit of the people.4' Second, Jewish law
required accuracy for the reproduction of texts.42 Jewish law
enjoys a strong tradition of protecting the moral rights of au-
thors including the right to protect the integrity of an au-
thor's work.43 These moral rights included the right of attri-
bution. At least as early as 70 A.D., Jewish law required that
credit be given when using words or ideas of others."
3. The Legend of St. Columba in the Sixth Century
After the decline and fall of the Roman Empire in the
fifth century,45 bookmaking and the preservation of literature
fell largely upon various monasteries throughout Europe.46
From this period comes the earliest account of what might be
considered a copyright dispute, a dispute in Ireland between
40. According to one source, at least prior to the invention of the printing
press in the fifteenth century, "Jewish law did not recognize property rights in
literary works. All works belonged in the public domain." Matthew I. Kozinets,
Copyright and Jewish Law: The Dilemma of Change, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 83, 84 (1995).
41. See Petuchowski, supra note 38 at 49 (stating that "copying was the es-
sence of the transmittal of knowledge").
42. See Nimmer, supra note 38, at 231-32 (noting reverence for the scrip-
tures has resulted in preservation of the exact text through the ages).
43. See id. at 231 (noting the moral right of the author to protect the integ-
rity of her work).
44. See J. David Bleich, Current Responsa, Decisions of Bate Din and Rab-
binical Literature, 5 JEWISH L. ANN. 65, 71-72 (1985) (discussing the need to
give credit for the insights of scholars); Victor Hazan, The Origins of Copyright
Law in Ancient Jewish Law, 18 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y 23, 25 (1971) (stating
the rule as "'reporting a thing in the name of him who said it' and not saying
things told by somebody else as if those same things were said by yourself').
Failure to give proper credit was viewed as "stealing of words." Hazan, supra,
at 25.
45. See HANS JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
21 (1978) (noting permanent division of the empire in 395 A.D., and the fall of
the Western Empire and Rome in 476 A.D.).
46. GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, BOOKS AND THEIR MAKERS DURING THE
MIDDLE AGES 11 (1962) (1896-97) (noting that monasteries preserved classic lit-
erature that escaped the devastation of Italy). According to Putnam, "For a pe-
riod of more than six centuries, the safety of the literary heritage of Europe...
depended upon the scribes of a few dozen scattered monasteries." Id.; see also
EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 11 (2000) ("From
about A.D. 500 to 1500, the primary keeper and reproducer of books was the
church, using the labor of thousands of monks .... "); N.F. BLAKE, CAXTON:
ENGLAND'S FIRST PUBLISHER 156 (1975) ("In the early Middle Ages the provi-
sion of manuscripts was to all intents and purposes a monastic monopoly.").
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Saint Columba 47 and Saint Finnian41 circa 560 A.D. 49 Details
of the dispute vary and have been embellished," but the basic
story is this: the Irish monk Columba visited his former
teacher Finnian at a monastery. While at the monastery,
Columba secretly and without permission copied a psalter5'
owned by Finnian." Finnian discovered Columba's deed and
demanded the copy. Columba refused and claimed that he
47. St. Columba, also known as Columcille, lived from 521 to 597 A.D. THE
COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 24, at 604; see also PADRAIC COLUM, THE
LEGEND OF SAINT COLUMBA 4 (1935) (stating that Saint Columba's name was
"Crimhaun," but he was called "Colum-cille," which means "Columba" in Latin).
He is one of three patron saints of the Irish. See THE COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 24, at 604.
48. Saint Finnian was known as Finnian of Moville. See LUCY MENZIES,
SAINT COLUMBA OF IONA: A STUDY OF HIS LIFE, HIS TIMES, & HIS INFLUENCE
22 (facs. reprint 1992) (1920). He lived from 495-589 A.D. and founded the
monastery of Druim Fionn. THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, THE CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY 367 (1941). He was also known as Finnbar. See 3
THE COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT, THE MONKS OF THE WEST: FROM ST. BENEDICT
TO ST. BERNARD 108 & n.1 (1867).
49. One of the earliest accounts of this story is from MANUS O'DONNELL,
LIFE OF ST. COLUMBA (1532), relevant parts reprinted in H.J. LAWLOR, The
Cathach of St. Columba, in 33 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL IRISH ACADEMY 292-
98 § C (1916).
50. At this distance it is difficult to state with certainty how much of the
story is factual.
51. The psalter was a version of certain psalms with interpretive headings.
See Jeremy Phillips, St. Columba the Copyright Infiinger, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 350, 352 (1985) (stating the copy of the psalter, as it exists today, covers
psalms 31 to 106 and appears to be a copy of a translation by St. Jerome);
LAWLOR, supra note 49, at 245-92 § C (describing Cathach in detail).
52. One of the more interesting versions of the story purports that Columba
made the copy secretly, at night, and that the light necessary for the job radi-
ated from Columba's left hand while he wrote with his right hand. See COUNT
DE MONTALEMBERT, supra note 48, at 119. Others have it that it was his right
hand which blazed with light. See MENZIES, supra note 48, at 23 (claiming fin-
gers on his right hand shone like candles); MANUS O'DONNELL, THE LIFE OF
COLUM CILLE 97 (Brian Lacey ed., 1998) (original in Gaelic written in 1532)
(stating that five fingers on Columba's right hand blazed like bright lamps).
The story also claims that "[a] curious wanderer, passing the church, was at-
tracted by the singular light, and looked in through the keyhole, and while his
face was pressed against the door his eye was suddenly torn out by a crane
which was roosting in the church." PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 46; accord
MENZIES, supra note 48, at 24. In other accounts the "curious wander" is a
youth sent by Finnian. See O'DONNELL, supra, at 97. In a happy ending for the
boy, Finnian is said to have blessed and healed the eye. See O'DONNELL, supra,
at 97. Another account claims that Columba used a candle brought to him by
his pet crane. This account further reports that the crane attacked Finnian on
the knee, and struck another person with its beak below the eye opening a gash.
See COLUM, supra note 47, at 70-72.
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owned the copy. 3 Allegedly, the case was brought before the
King of Ireland, King Dermott,' who found for Finnian. King
Dermott pronounced the now famous judgment, "To every cow
her calf, and consequently to every book its copy."55 Partly in
response to this dispute, Columba precipitated a civil war
which ultimately resulted in defeat of the King.56 The alleged
copy of the psalter became famous and is known as
"Cathach" meaning "fighter" or "battler."57 The Cathach is
among the earliest surviving Irish manuscripts and is in the
custody of the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin.58Assuming the
story of Saint Columba and the psalter has a factual basis, 9 it
53. One account of the story, in what sounds something like a fair use ar-
gument, reports Columba's position as follows:
"But I hold," said Colum Cille, "that Finnian's book has not decreased
in value because of the transcript I made from it; also that it is not
right to extinguish the divine things it contained, or to prevent me or
anybody else from copying it, or reading it, or circulating it throughout
the provinces. I further maintain that if I benefited by its transcrip-
tion, which I desired to be for the general good, provided no injury ac-
crued to Finnian or his book thereby, it was quite permissible for me to
copy it!"
MENZIES, supra note 48, at 25; accord O'DONNELL, supra note 52, at 99 (describ-
ing the story in similar language).
54. There are a number of variations and spellings of this name including
Diarmid, see COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT, supra note 48, at 119 (referring to
King Diarmid or Dermott), and Diarmait, see ADOMNAN OF IONA, LIFE OF ST
COLUMBA 296 n.157 (Richard Sharpe trans., 1995) (stating the complete name,
Diarmait Mac Cerbaill and discussing the history and existence of the alleged
king).
55. See COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT, supra note 48, at 121-22; accord
MENZIES, supra note 48, at 25 ("To every cow her calf, to every book its tran-
script.").
56. COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT, supra note 48, at 122-26 (discussing the
civil war and Columba's part in it).
57. See COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT, supra note 48, at 126-27, 127 n.1 (dis-
cussing Cathach); see also ADOMNAN OF IONA, supra note 54, at 284-85 n.125
(noting that Cathach may be a genuine copy made by Columba and citing sup-
port). Some question exists as to whether the Cathach was actually Columba's
work. See CHRISTOPHER DE HAMEL, A HISTORY OF ILLUMINATED MANUSCRIPTS
19-20 (1986) (stating that Cathach "used to be" associated with the legend of
Columba and Finnian, and dating the manuscript back to the seventh century).
58. See PETER HARBISON, PILGRIMAGE IN IRELAND 158 (1992) (discussing
the Cathach); DE HAMEL, supra note 57, at 19-20 (discussing the Cathach and
providing an illustration of an excerpt from the manuscript); PETER HARBISON
ET AL., IRISH ART AND ARCHITECTURE: FROM PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT 42-
43 (1978) (discussing Cathach and providing illustrations of excerpts); Phillips,
supra note 51, at 352 (discussing the fact that the Cathach consists of 58 leaves
covering Psalms 31 to 106); LAWLOR, supra note 49, at 243-45 (discussing the
discovery and history of Cathach).
59. See Phillips, supra note 51, at 352 (concluding that there is some evi-
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supports the idea that there were limits on the right to repro-
duce a manuscript. Even if King Dermott's ruling was an iso-
lated decision and not driven by any generally accepted legal
principles, it demonstrates that people recognized the issue
posed by copying a book without permission. Even if the
story is completely fictional, the dated history and content of
the story itself demonstrate that long before modern copy-
right protection, at least some people understood that posses-
sion of a book did not necessarily entitle the possessor to
freely copy it.6"
In particular, two aspects of the dispute are worth con-
sidering. First, according to most versions of the story,
Columba was given access to the manuscript (not for copying,
but for reading);" thus, there was no issue of theft of the
manuscript itself. Additionally, there was no record of any
physical damage to the manuscript. This brings the copyright
issue into focus-did one in rightful possession" of a manu-
script have the right to copy it without permission of the
manuscript's owner? King Dermott answered no; the copy
was an extension of the original.
Second, there was no question concerning authors' rights.
Finnian was the owner of the psalter but was not its author.3
In fact, given the practice of the times and the nature of the
psalter as primarily based on scriptural works, Finnian's
psalter itself was almost certainly a copy of another manu-
script. The failure to acknowledge or consider authors' rights
is consistent with early development of copyright law gener-
ally. Rights of authors, at best, took a backseat. Rights of
owners of manuscripts, publishers, or booksellers were the
only concern. The story of Columba is significant not only be-
cause it hints at copyright protection, but also because it and
the broader accounts of Columba's life confirms the develop-
dence that at least part of the story is true).
60. Manus O'Donnell wrote about the story in his work, THE LIFE OF COLUM
CILLE, which was completed in 1532, and was based upon folk traditions and
various written works. See O'DONNELL, supra note 52, at 97-98 (reporting the
story in 1532); id. at 7 (discussing the history of O'Donnell's work).
61. See MENZIES, supra note 48, at 23 (stating that Finnian gave Columba
access to the manuscript).
62. Columba's access may not have risen to the level of possession, but at a
minimum it was rightful access to the manuscript.
63. See MENZIES, supra note 48, at 23 (stating that Finnian had recently
returned from Rome and Europe bringing with him precious books).
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ment of literature and bookmaking in monasteries during
these early centuries.'
B. Invention of the Printing Press in the Fifteenth Century
Technology has long driven development of copyright
law. As those who have experienced the major technological
advances of the twentieth century can appreciate, advances
that make the copying and distribution of works easier have
important copyright implications. In ancient times, writings
were made on clay tablets, 5 stone," metal plates,67 wood," pa-
pyrus," animal skins,7 and parchment.7' Suitable materials
were often expensive and scarce,7 2 and writing on these mate-
64. ADOMNAN OF IONA, supra note 54, at 284 n.125 (noting the importance
of copying of texts at Columba's monastery and noting that copying was almost
a daily occupation for Columba). According to the Count de Montalembert, "Co-
lumbia had a passion for fine manuscripts... . He went everywhere in search
of volumes, which he could borrow or copy, often experiencing refusals which he
resented bitterly." COUNT OF MONTALEMBERT, supra note 48, at 117-18.
65. See ALAN MILLARD, READING AND WRITING IN THE TIME OF JESUS 22-23
(2001) (stating that the earliest known documents are clay tablets).
66. See id. at 23 (noting limited use of stone); see also, e.g., The Master of
Balliol, Introduction, in THE LEGACY OF ISRAEL xiii (Edwyn Bevan & Charles
Singer eds., 1927) (discussing of inscription on Moabite stone dating back to 850
B.C.). Id. at 1 (showing an illustration of the Moabite stone).
67. See PAUL R. CHEESMAN, ANCIENT WRITING ON METAL PLATES 47-77
(1985) (discussing writings on lead, bronze, copper, and gold plates dating back
hundreds of years B.C.); see also, e.g., Edwyn Bevan, Hellenistic Judaism, in
THE LEGACY OF ISRAEL, supra note 66, at 68 (noting Jewish writings and illus-
trations on gold plates from early Christian centuries).
68. See THOMAS FRANCIS CARTER, THE INVENTION OF PRINTING IN CHINA
AND ITS SPREAD WESTWARD 3-4 (2d ed. 1955) (noting that the Chinese used
bamboo and wood); GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 50 (noting that Greeks and Ro-
mans used wood tablets).
69. See GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 44 (discussing the use of papyrus in
Greco-Roman antiquity). Papyrus was a type of paper made from papyrus plant
grown in southern Europe and northern Africa. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 795 (1995). The word "paper" comes from the word "papyrus." See
id. at 794.
70. See GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 45-46 ("Animal skins.., had been used
from great antiquity for writing."); id. (noting that Jews used animal skins);
MILLARD, supra note 65, at 25-26 (discussing the use of leather and parchment
for writing).
71. See MILLARD, supra note 65, at 25-26 (discussing the use of leather and
parchment); GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 45-46 (discussing the history and manu-
facture of parchment). Parchment was made from animal skins. Id.
72. Papyrus had to be imported to Europe from Egypt. See MILLARD, supra
note 65, at 25 (discussing Egyptian exports of papyrus to Europe and stating
that "although the papyrus reed grew in other places, there is no sign that the
writing material was manufactured outside Egypt"). Parchment and leather
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rials could be difficult and time consuming. Transporting and
preserving these writings could also be difficult. Under these
conditions, the logistics of copying writings served as barriers
to large scale copying and distribution of writings. The devel-
opment of paper73 and improvements in ink74 made copying
easier,75 but it was the invention of the printing press with
moveable type7 1 that really prompted the development of
copyright protection.77
The moveable type printing press facilitated efficient,
mass duplication of a single manuscript. 78 The importance of
the printing press can hardly be overstated. With multiple
copies and decreased costs associated with printing, literature
became more accessible.79 Printing also doubtlessly saved
many works from extinction. Printing not only made possible
the mass production of books, but also assured their accuracy.
One scholar, Elizabeth Eisenstein, explained the problems
associated with copying manuscripts by hand:
had to be carefully prepared in a complex process by stretching and smoothing.
See GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 46.
73. See LEONARDAS VYTAUTAS GERULAITIS, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING IN
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY VENICE 9-10 (1976) (discussing the need for paper and
early paper production in Europe).
74. See id. at 15-16 (discussing the development of ink suitable for printing).
75. See id. at 12 (noting that "books in great numbers and variety would be
unfeasible without paper because other printing stock is too expensive or
bulky").
76. Many centuries prior to the invention of the printing press with move-
able type, dating back prior to 770 A.D., the Chinese developed block printing.
See CARTER, supra note 68, at 37-42 (discussing early beginnings of block print-
ing). Block printing involved characters or illustrations carved onto wooden
blocks which were then covered with ink. See DENIS TWITCHETT, PRINTING AND
PUBLISHING IN MEDIEVAL CHINA 13, 68-73 (1983) (discussing wood block print-
ing in China).
77. See 1 BROOM & HADLEY, supra note 10, at 794.
78. Elizabeth Eisenstein explains: "In 1483, the Ripoli Press charged three
florins per quinterno for setting up and printing Ficino's translation of Plato's
Dialogues. A scribe might have charged one florin per quinterno for duplicating
the same work. The Ripoli Press produced 1,025 copies; the scribe would have
turned out one." ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE 16 (1983). The size of each edition of a work would
vary. A typical edition might be several hundred copies, but some consisted of
several thousand copies. See H.S. BENNETT, ENGLISH BOOKS & READERS 1475
TO 1557, at 224-28 (1952) (reporting 3,000 volumes of an edition of the New Tes-
tament in 1525, but concluding that ordinary works generally would be no more
than 600-700 copies).
79. See GERULAITIS, supra note 73, at 9-10 (noting that competition among
printers and decreased prices made books more accessible to the public and fu-
eled demand).
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In view of the proliferation of "unique" texts and of the ac-
cumulation of variants, it is doubtful whether one should
refer to "identical copies" being "multiplied" before print.
This point is especially important when considering tech-
nical literature. The difficulty of making even one "identi-
cal" copy of a significant technical work was such that the
task could not be trusted to any hired hands. Men of
learning had to engage in "slavish copying" of tables, dia-
grams, and unfamiliar terms.80
Freed from the need to engage in "slavish copying," scholars
could then spend their time more productively, in reflection,
research, or writing.8"
As early as the 1430s, Johan Gutenberg, a goldsmith, be-
gan work on the development of the printing press." By
about 1450, Gutenberg had developed the printing press in
Mainz, Germany.83 The first known substantial work pub-
lished 4 using Gutenberg's printing press is the now-famous
forty-two-line Bible, known as the Gutenberg Bible or the
Mazarin" Bible," published in 1455 or early 1456.87 Printing
80. EISENSTEIN, supra note 78, at 17.
81. Id.
82. An exact chronology of the development of the printing press is not
known. See BLAKE, supra note 46, at 3 ("It is not possible to date this invention
exactly, partly because as there was no patent law then the inventors wanted to
keep the details of the process a secret."). Blake speculates that Gutenberg may
have already begun his experiments with printing by 1430. Id.; see also
GERULAITIS, supra note 73, at 15 (stating that the printing process was known
by 1439). Several scholars date development of the printing press to the period
of 1440 to 1450. See id. at 3-4 (discussing Gutenberg and the invention of the
printing press); PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 358-60 (noting the existence of a
completed press became known in 1450, and work may have begun ten or more
years earlier). Most of what is known about Gutenberg's efforts during this pe-
riod is taken from legal documents from two lawsuits involving Gutenberg. See
BLAKE, supra note 46, at 3-4 (discussing 1439 and 1455 lawsuits).
83. PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 358-60 (noting that the existence of Guten-
berg's press became known in 1450).
84. There may have been some shorter works printed prior to the Bible, but
the evidence on this point is inconclusive. See BLAKE, supra note 46, at 4-5
(recognizing that the Bible may not have been the first work published, "but it
was almost certainly the first extensive work to be completed").
85. Mazarin was a seventeenth century French cardinal and prime minister
of France whose library contained a copy of the Gutenberg Bible. See 1 HENRY
HALLAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURE OF EUROPE 152 (4th ed. 1854)
(noting the rediscovery of the Gutenberg Bible in Cardinal Mazarin's library);
NORMA LEVARIE, THE ART & HISTORY OF BOOKS 77 (1982) (discussing Mazarin
Bible); see also THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 48, at 616 (identify-
ing Mazarin).
86. One source speculates that there were about two hundred copies
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press technology spread rapidly all over Europe,"8 first to
other parts of Germany during the 1460s, then to Italy in
about 1465, and to France in the same decade. 9 During the
1470s it spread to most of the rest of Europe, from Spain to
Poland." The printing press arrived in England in 1476, and
William Caxton became the first English printer.9'
During the period following the introduction of the print-
ing press, the businesses of publishing and bookselling took
on increased importance. Prior to the printing press, there
were book production and sales,92 but on a more limited
scale.93 Due to the printing press, printers, publishers, book-
sellers, and related businesses94 sprang up all over Europe,
printed. LEVARIE, supra note 85, at 77. According to Levarie, there are twelve
vellum copies and thirty-six paper copies still in existence. Id.
87. See BLAKE, supra note 46, at 4 (stating that the Bible was published in
late 1455 or early 1456); LEVARIE, supra note 85, at 77 (stating that the Bible
must have been printed at least a year prior to August 1456). Unfortunately for
Gutenberg, his financial backer, Fust, foreclosed on a debt owed by Gutenberg
and took away his press in 1455. Gutenberg's assistant, Peter Schoeffer, stayed
on and continued to work for Fust. See BLAKE, supra note 46, at 4-5 (stating
that the 42-line Bible was "substantially the work of Gutenberg" but Gutenberg
was prevented from benefiting financially from it).
88. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 78, at 14-15 (reproducing maps showing lo-
cations in Europe where printing was carried on for periods up to 1500).
89. See BLAKE, supra note 46, at 9-10 (discussing the spread of printing
throughout Germany, Italy, France and other European countries during the
1460s); 1 HALLAM, supra note 85, at 157-60 (discussing the early printers in
Europe).
90. See BLAKE, supra note 46, at 11.
91. For a history of William Caxton and the beginning of printing in Eng-
land, see generally BENNETT, supra note 78, at 1-18; BLAKE, supra note 46, at 1-
212; N.F. BLAKE, CAXTON AND HIS WORLD 13-239 (1969).
92. Greece had a modest commercial book trade in the fourth century B.C.
See GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 85. Rome had a commercial book trade by about
the first century A.D. See id. at 86 (identifying certain Roman book dealers by
name). Atticus, a wealthy Roman and close friend of Cicero, was known as a
famous book maker. Some have suggested that he was in the bookmaking busi-
ness, see WITTENBERG, supra note 30, at 4 (discussing Atticus's mass publishing
business), but others have discounted this suggestion, see GAMBLE, supra note
30, at 86 (acknowledging that Atticus distributed books and had well-trained
slaves to copy texts, but maintaining that he was not a commercial book dealer).
In England during the fourteenth century, individuals involved in the book
trade formed a Brotherhood of Manuscript Producers. See WITTENBERG, supra
note 30, at 9-10 (noting the founding of the Brotherhood of Manuscript Produc-
ers, and the founding of the Craft of Writers of Text-Letters in about 1403).
93. See GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 86-88 (describing the book trade in the
Roman empire as limited in scale and stating that "[t]he commercial market for
any book must have been extremely limited").
94. In addition to the publishers with the printing presses, there were not
only the booksellers, but also those involved in the manufacture and sale of ink,
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and they became an important part of their local economies.95
Some publishing houses were substantial operations. One
early printer, Anthoni Koberger of Nuremberg, by 1509 re-
portedly had about twenty-four presses and employed more
than one hundred workers." Many early printers and pub-
lishers were also retail booksellers.97
C, Special Privileges Granted to Printers
Printers often wielded significant influence in their com-
munities.9' By nature of the business, they tended to be edu-
cated and well connected. 99 To be a successful printer, one
had to be able to read, possess substantial business acumen,
and have substantial financial backing to afford the capital
investment required to obtain and maintain a printing press
and run a business.100
These printers, the equivalent of our modern-day pub-
lishers, from very early on had the ear of government leaders,
and they used their position to obtain special privileges to
protect their interests. These grants of special privileges may
be viewed as the first copyrights. Significantly, these privi-
leges primarily applied to publishers rather than authors.
The efforts and investments of publishers brought the works
to the public, and the publishers were considered the owners
paper, and equipment required for book making. Id.
95. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 78, at 12 ("Unknown anywhere in Europe
before the mid-fifteenth century, printers' workshops would be found in every
important municipal center by 1500."); id. at 13-15 (reproducing maps showing
locations in Europe where printing was carried on for periods up to 1500).
96. PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 149-50.
97. See HELLMUT LEHMANN-HAuPT, PETER SCHOEFFER OF GERNSHEIM AND
MAINZ 85 (1950) (noting that Schoeffer, like other early printers, also sold his
own books).
98. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 411 (stating early printer Nicolas
Jenson received from the Pope the honorary title of Count Palatine in 1479).
99. See, e.g., BLAKE, supra note 46, at 2 (stating that Gutenberg was a gold-
smith of a patrician family); id. at 17 (stating that William Caxton, prior to be-
coming a printer, "was clearly an influential and possibly a wealthy merchant");
PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 417-18 (noting that the famous Italian printer Aldus
Manutius (1450-1515) was a scholar of Latin and Greek and a tutor of princess's
sons); 2 id at 156 (stating that a full mastery of Latin "was, in fact, a first re-
quirement for any publisher of scholarly literature"); id. at 178 (characterizing
printer Johann Froben of Basel (1460-1528) as a scholar in Latin, Greek, and
Hebrew).
100. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 78, at 23, 26 (describing the master printer
and others in the printing shop).
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of any rights to the works.' This was particularly true dur-
ing the early days of printing when many works were classics
whose authors were long since gone.1 0 2
The problem of "piracy" of a work arose very early and
was a significant concern for printers and publishers. After
the work of editing and setting a book, a second printer could
quickly copy the book, without the expense or risk involved in
purchasing the manuscript, preparing the layout, editing it,
or marketing it.1"3 This allowed the second printer to under-
sell the original publisher. Gutenberg's successors, Fust and
Schoeffer of Mainz, allegedly pirated an edition from Mente-
lin of Stasburg,"' and Mentelin may have pirated an earlier
edition of a different work by Fust and Schoeffer. 5 The early
Italian publisher Aldus Manutius, who published from 1495
to 1515, also had to deal with competition for pirated copies of
his works.0 6 In England, in 1533, the printer Wynkyn de
Worde (Caxton's assistant and successor)107 complained of pi-
racy of his works.0 8
101. See PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 15-16 (noting that publishers claim own-
ership of works).
102. See id. at 16 (stating that printed literature of the time was largely old-
time classics).
103. See CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS' COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403-
1959, 32 (1960) (noting that early English printers "were quite ready to profit by
the enterprise of others," by taking advantage of the original printer's trouble
and expenses of preparing the work).
104. Fred W. Householder, The First Pirate, in 24 THE LIBRARY 30, 35 & n.1
(F.C. Francis ed., 1944) (discussing Paulus de Sancta Maria's Scrutinium Scrip-
turarum with editions dated 1471 and 1478).
105. 24 Id. at 30-46 (discussing whether Fust and Schoeffer pirated Mente-
lin's edition or visa versa; concluding Fust's edition of St. Augustine's de Doc-
trina Christiana was first).
106. According to George Putnam:
Another serious difficulty with which Aldus had to contend was the
competition of the piratical copies of his editions which promptly ap-
peared in Cologne, Tubingen, Lyons, and... Florence. The most seri-
ous interference with his undertakings appears to have come from the
printers of Lyons, who ... speedily won for their city notoriety as the
centre of piratical publishing.
PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 433.
107. See BLAKE, supra note 91, at 81 (stating de Worde was Caxton's assis-
tant and successor).
108. "In 1533 appeared the first complaint of piracy, that of Wynken de
Wordi, who obtained the King's privilege for his second edition of Witinton's
Grammar, because Peter Trevers had reprinted it from the edition of 1523."
BOWKER, supra note 30, at 21; accord Matthews, supra note 18, at 589 (discuss-
ing Wynken de Wordi). The accepted spelling of de Worde's name is Wynkyn de
Worde, but it is sometimes seen spelled as "Wynken" and occasionally as "de
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Some printers relied upon "courtesy of the trade" or ex-
press agreements to protect their interests. 1 9  To protect
themselves from what they considered to be unfair competi-
tion, others sought special protection from government au-
thorities. The protection usually came in the form of specific
privileges extended to particular publishers for particular
works and usually for limited times.
The first of many privileges was granted by the Senate of
Venice in 1469, to the printer John of Speyer, who received
the exclusive right to all printing in Venice for five years."0
This complete monopoly was not a typical privilege, and it did
not last long; John died in 1470, and with his death the mo-
nopoly ended."' Later privileges were granted to authors,
publishers, translators, or editors for specific works or types
of works."2 In some cases printers sought and received privi-
leges that identified specific authors but not specific works."3
In some cases, authors, rather than the printers, received
the privilege.14  Perhaps the earliest privilege to an author
was granted in Venice to Marcus Antonius Sabellicus"5 on
September 1, 1486, for his work on the history of Venice. The
privilege stated:
The history of our city, written by the very learned Marcus
Antonius Sabellicus from Rome, deserves for its eloquence
and historical veracity to come into full public view. There-
Wordi."
109. BOWKER, supra note 30, at 10 (referring to the early printer Koberger
who relied on "'courtesy of the trade,' and indeed made an agreement in 1495
with Kessler of Basel to respect each other's rights").
110. See BOWKER, supra note 30, at 13 (discussing the privilege granted to
John Speyer); HORATIO F. BROWN, THE VENETIAN PRINTING PRESS 1469-1800,
at 52 (reprint 1969) (1891) (discussing the privilege granted to John Speyer);
GERULAITIS, supra note 73, at 20-21 (discussing the privilege granted to John
Speyer). Speyer is also seen as Spira or Spire.
111. GERULAITIS, supra note 73, at 20-21.
112. For an excellent discussion of the various types of privileges granted in
Venice, see GERULAITIS, supra note 73, at 31-43. See also BROWN, supra note
110, at 52-55 (identifying and discussing five kinds of privileges).
113. See GERULAITIS, supra note 73, at 45 ("It had become customary for a
printer to obtain as many privileges as possible, often not even specifying titles
but only authors.").
114. See BOWKER, supra note 30, at 10, 13 (noting instances of privileges
granted to Antonio Sabellico in 1486 and Peter of Ravenna in 1491); id at 14
(discussing protections granted by Venice in the early sixteenth century and
stating that "[c]opyrights to authors became frequent").
115. Horatio Brown identifies Sabellicus by his Italian name "Marc' Antonio
Sabellico," rather than his Latin name. BROWN, supra note 110, at 53.
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fore we, the undersigned noble Councillors, have debated
and decreed that the aforementioned work... can be en-
trusted to some expert printer to print ... furthermore, we
shall not permit anyone other than him to have the said
work printed, under penalty of the displeasure of the most
serene Signoria and a [a fine] of 500 ducats .... "'
Significantly, the rulers of Venice state their rationale for
granting the privilege-to encourage this worthy work "to
come into full public view.""' 7 Because the work was a history
of Venice, in the eyes of the rulers, Sabellicus's work was par-
ticularly important for the public good. But other works too
would benefit the public, and Venice sought to encourage
them.118
That Venice in these early years began to recognize au-
thors' rights in their literary works is further demonstrated
by the privilege granted to Daniele Barbaro in 1493, when the
College (or Cabinet) of Venice granted a privilege to him for a
work written by his brother, Hermolao, who had subsequently
died."' Daniele, as his brother's heir, was granted the ten-
year privilege.' Barbaro's privilege is noteworthy because it
indicates that an author's successor could be entitled to a
privilege. Other parts of Europe also adopted the practice of
granting privileges.'2 '
From the point of view of printers and authors, there was
an immediate economic need for a privilege. One concern was
the need to recoup the expense of production of a given edi-
tion and provide a reasonable return. Gabriel and his part-
ners petitioned for a privilege in 1497, stating that they had
116. VENICE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1450-1630 371 (David Chambers et
al. eds., 1992) (brackets in original) (translation from Latin found in ASV
COLLEGIO, NOTATORIO, reg. 13, ff. 118v, 145r); see also BROWN, supra note 110,
at 53 (discussing the privilege granted to Marc Antonio Sabellico).
117. VENICE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 116, at 371.
118. See id. at 372 (stating that in the 1497 petition for privilege, there was a
desire to print in Greek and Latin "for the general good, honour and reputation
of our most splendid Republic") (quoting R. Fulin, Documenti per servire alla
storia della stampa veneziana, 23 ARCHIO VENETO 131 (1882)); see also Put-
nam, supra note 30, at 35, 44 (concluding that motive for grant of privileges in
Italy was to "induc[e] printers.., to undertake certain literary enterprises
which were believed to be of importance to the community").
119. BROWN, supra note 110, at 53.
120. Id.
121. See BLAGDEN, supra note 103, at 32 (stating that the first privilege ob-
tained in Paris was in 1507); Matthews, supra note 18, at 589 (stating that the
first privilege obtained in Germany was in 1501).
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"spent a great deal of money in this admirable and most use-
ful enterprise [efforts to bring Greek and Latin texts to print],
and, because the debt [was] heavier than their own resources
[could] bear," they needed a privilege. 2  The need to limit un-
fair piracy was another related concern. Gabriel and his
partners further complained that "there may be many who,
through hatred or jealousy, will use any means to injure the
said company or crush it entirely. 1 23 Therefore, they asked
for "the special favour of a monopoly" for their new technique
(a patent), and a prohibition against publication of four Greek
works124 "on pain of forfeiting all copies and paying a fine of 1
ducat per volume."12  The petitioners concluded by virtue of
the privilege they could pay their debts and "would also gain
some advantage from their labour and experiment, and would
not be ruined for having made the attempt."'
2 6
"Pirated" copies that might "spoil" the market were a
concern and were a primary justification for the grant of
privileges. The 1496 petition of Bernardino Rasma for a
privilege states the case:
For when [a printer-publisher] shall have set himself to
produce a book of rare beauty-which entails the absorp-
tion of all his capital in it-should his brother merchants
come to hear of it, they use every cunning device to steal
the proofs of the new work.. . and set to... print the
book before the original designer of the book can finish his
edition, which, when it is ready for issue, finds the market
spoiled by the pirated edition.'27
But the early system of Venetian privileges began to cre-
ate problems for those they were intended to benefit. Venice
granted numerous privileges but some were conflicting or
ambiguous. One privilege was granted but identified neither
the protected title nor author.2  Other privileges were ob-
122. VENICE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 116, at 372 (from the
Latin) (quoting R. Fulin, Documenti per servire alla storia della stampa
veneziana, 23 ARCHIvIO VENETO 131 (1882)).
123. Id.
124. These works were The Letters of Brutus and Phalaris, Pollux, Philostra-
tus, and the Fables of Aesop. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. BROWN, supra note 110, at 55-56.
128. See GERULAITIS, supra note 73, at 45 (identifying the privilege given to
Stefano Vosonio).
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tained in bad faith-where the privilege holder had no inten-
tion of publishing the work, but rather intended to extract
payment for the rights, or simply intended to prevent others
from publishing the work. '29 Horatio Brown explained:
By no means all the works for which privileges were de-
manded, issued from the press. For when the custom of
asking for privileges took firm hold on the printing and
publishing trade, there was a rush of printer-publishers to
secure copyrights in a great number of books which they
130had small prospect of ever setting up in type,....
The number and nature of privileges resulted in both obsta-
cles to printing' and the risk of unintentional infringe-
ment.
132
In 1517, the Senate of Venice attempted to address this
problem with an enactment that should be credited as the
first copyright statute.' 3   The statute eliminated all prior
privileges and placed all works already published in the pub-
lic domain. ' The enactment limited future protection to new
works or works not yet printed, and a privilege would only be
allowed after a two-thirds vote in the Senate.' Grants of
prior privileges were, in essence, a series of private acts to
address needs of specific individuals; the 1517 law was the
first public copyright law of general application.
In 1533, Venice passed broader copyright laws.'36 These
129. See PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 360. These "bad faith" privileges bring to
mind the 1990s modern practice of cybersquatters who attempted to reserve
internet domain names using well known trademarks or celebrity names in an
effort to extract payments from the trademark owners or celebrities who would
later want to use those domain names. See, e.g., Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen,
947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting that the defendant had registered 240
internet domain names with the intent of reselling or licensing their use by en-
tities who did business under those names; defendant's registered domain
names included deltaairlines.com, eddiebauer.com, unionpacific.com); see also
Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000)
(finding violation of the Anitcybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and order-
ing release of interest in domain name).
130. BROWN, supra note 110, at 54.
131. Id. at 74 (noting that "[t]he trade was throttled").
132. See GERULAITIS, supra note 73, at 45 (noting danger of unwittingly in-
fringing).
133. See BROWN, supra note 110, at 207 (including a copy of the statute of
August 1, 1517 in original Latin).
134. BROWN, supra note 110, at 74; PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 360.
135. BROWN, supra note 110, at 74.
136. See id. at 75-76 (discussing the law of 1517); id. at 208-09 (reproducing
the language of the 1517 law); PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 360-61 (discussing the
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early Venetian privileges and enactments were concerned
primarily with protecting and regulating printers;17 the in-
terests of authors were not at issue. Printers printed works
without any concern for the author's wishes."'8 In about 1544,
Venice began to afford greater consideration to rights of au-
thors and began to require evidence of the author's consent in
order to obtain the privilege to print a work."9
The number of privileges granted under these laws in a
particular year varied, but the numbers were not insignifi-
cant. The highest number of works for which privileges were
granted in a single year was 117 in 1561.140
It is not surprising that Venice would be the early leader
in the development of copyright law. During the late fifteenth
century and the sixteenth century, Venice was a leading pub-
lishing center.4 1 One hundred fifty-five printers established
themselves in Venice during the period of 1472 to 1500;
142
these printers produced as many as 4,500 different editions
through the year 1500.143 Venice also became an important
1533 law). Richard Bowker characterizes the 1533 law as "the first real copy-
right code." BOWKER, supra note 30, at 15.
137. The laws were largely for regulation of the printing trade. The 1517 law
was to remove "a mass of obstruction" to printers to allow development of pub-
lishing in Venice. PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 360. The 1526 law was a censor-
ship law requiring review and approval by two censors before a book could be
printed. Id. Among other things, the 1533 law imposed price controls on the
books to be published. Id. at 361. A 1543 law addressed the problem of poor
quality books and required use of quality paper. Id. at 361-62.
138. See id. at 363.
During the half century in which their business had been carried on,
the printer-publishers in Venice (in common with those of the rest of
Europe) were in the habit of ignoring literary proprietorship altogether,
and were accustomed to print any work they pleased, even in direct op-
position to the wishes of the author.
Id.; accordBROWN, supra note 110, at 79 (discussing Venetian printers).
139. BROWN, supra note 110, at 79; PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 363.
140. BROWN, supra note 110, at 236-40 (listing numbers of works identified
in privileges granted by year); PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 370.
141. CHARLES YRIARTE, VENICE: ITS HISTORY-ART-INDUSTRIES AND
MODERN LIFE 319 (F.J. Sitwell trans., 1896) ("Venice remained for more than
two centuries the great centre of printing; her book trade was immense."); see
GERULAITIS, supra note 73, at 19 (claiming Venice was "the world's first center
for printing").
142. YRIARTE, supra note 141, at 316; cf GARRY WILLS, VENICE: LION CITY
308 (2001) (stating that there were 150 presses operating by 1500).
143. GERULAITUS, supra note 73, at 11; WILLS, supra note 142, at 308; see
also VENICE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 116, at 369 ("Venice pro-
duced roughly a sixth of all the books printed in Europe before 1500. ").
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center for printing music.14
Privileges were not issued solely by civil governments.
Jewish law concurrently developed its own system of printing
privileges. In 1550, an Italian rabbi extended protection to
an edition of Maimonides's Code, until the first issue sold
out.'4 5  Protection amounted to a ban against infringing or
against purchasing an infringing work at the peril of excom-
munication. 146 The rabbis perceived the need to balance the
interest in broad dissemination and availability of works
against the necessity that publishers make a profit and re-
coup the costs of publication. The result was the equivalent
of copyright protection for a limited duration to allow a pub-
lisher to recoup the costs of printing.'4 7 The term would be an
estimate of the time necessary to sell out the first edition; to-
day the term generally lasts from ten to twenty-five years.
4
1
Some limited copyright protection was viewed as a necessary
means to encourage production of works to benefit the pub-
lic." 9 In addition, the Popes also conferred special privileges
upon printers." °
144. YRIARTE, supra note 141, at 319; see also VENICE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 116, at 369 (stating "Venice excelled in the printing of mu-
sic").
145. See Bleich, supra note 44, at 73 (giving specifics of the case). The earli-
est known ban against reprinting was in 1518. Arthur J. Silverstein, Copyright
in Jewish Law, 4 PERF. ARTS REV. 33, 34 (1973) (giving specifics of the case); see
also id. at 35-36 (discussing the 1518 ban).
146. See Silverstein, supra note 145, at 42 (discussing enforcement of the ban
against reprinting).
147. According to J. David Bleich: "it became common practice for an author
or a prospective publisher to protect himself against financial loss by approach-
ing a rabbinic authority and securing a formal herem or ban against publication
of the same work by any other party for a stipulated period of time." Bleich,
supra note 44, at 74; see also Kozinets, supra note 40, at 89-92 (discussing bal-
ancing of the public interest and the publisher's interest, and the resulting rule
of limited duration protection).
148. Kozinets, supra note 40, at 94. Notice of the protection and the term of
protection are included in the front of a book. See Bleich, supra note 44, at 74
("The text of this ban was then customarily published in the prefatory section of
the book.").
149. See Silverstein, supra note 145, at 40 ("The main motivation in seeking
legal theories to justify copyright protection was the desire to encourage the
publication and reproduction of religious works.").
150. See BOWKER, supra note 30, at 17 (noting privileges given by Leo X in
early sixteenth century; infringement was punishable by excommunication);
PUTNAM, supra note 46, at 433 (noting privileges given by the Pope to Aldus).
Putnam concluded that these papal privileges were difficult to enforce and
"proved of very little service." Id.
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D. The Development of Early English Copyright Law. Royal
Privileges and the Stationers' Copyright
1. Grant of Royal Privileges to Printers
The history of English copyright began with royal privi-
leges and was followed shortly thereafter with the develop-
ment of a private contractual copyright under the auspices of
the Stationers' Company. The Crown granted printing privi-
leges first through warrants, beginning in 1518, and thereaf-
ter, beginning in about 1539, by both warrants and letters
patents. T5 Some privileges were specific to particular works;
others covered a category of works or all works of a particular
printer. 5' Privileges granted by warrant tended to last for a
shorter duration then did privileges granted by letters patent,
and warrants were specific to individual printers.'53 In con-
trast, privileges granted by letters patents (sometimes re-
ferred to as printing patents) usually covered classes of books
such as Bibles, psalters, or law books 54 and could be assigned
or inherited.'55 In perhaps the earliest example of a royal
privilege, the Royal Printer Richard Pynson in 1518 received
a printing privilege for a term of two years for a speech.'56
151. See HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 25-26 (1956) (dis-
cussing privileges and letters patents). John Feather points to a 1504 royal
grant to William Facques as King's Printer with the right to print various royal
documents as the first privilege granted in England. JOHN FEATHER,
PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN
BRITAIN 11 (1994).
152. See Arthur W. Reed, The Regulation of the Book Thade Before the Proc-
lamation of 1538, 15 TRANSACTIONS OF BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOC'Y 157, 173-75,
181 (1917-19) (discussing types of privileges and giving examples).
153. See RANSOM, supra note 151, at 25-26.
154. 2 A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF
LONDON; 1554-1640 A.D. 60-63 (Edward Arber, ed., 1967) (1875) (reproducing
texts of three letters patents, the first for primers and psalters, the second for
"the Cosmographicall glasse," and the third for an English Bible with annota-
tions) [hereinafter Arber].
155. See RANSOM, supra note 151, at 25-26. "As time went on, the distinction
between the printing privilege granted by warrant and the rights conveyed by
letters patent became indistinct. The term 'privilege' was used to include the
printing patent, and 'privileged printers' more often than not referred to patent-
ees." Id. at 27. For further discussion of printing patents see LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 78-113 (1968).
156. See BOWKER, supra note 30, at 19 (stating that the first printing privi-
lege was granted to Pynson in 1518 for a term of two years); RANSOM, supra
note 151, at 25 (stating that the first privileges in 1518 were grants to Rastell
and Pynson); Reed, supra note 152, at 173-75 (discussing privileges given to
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Whether in the form of a warrant or printers patent, these
royal privileges had the effect of granting the holder of the
privilege the exclusive right to publish a work within the
scope of the privilege for the term stated.'57 These privileges
are recognized by some as the earliest forms of copyright in
England and are therefore the direct ancestors of American
copyrights.
The printers sought these privileges for the same finan-
cial reasons the Venetian printers sought them-economics. 8
In one commentary from 1582, the report's author commented
that the number of printers had greatly increased so that
printers were "driven through necessity" to contract for low
prices and "were most times small gainers, and often los-
ers."'' 9 These hardships forced printers to seek privileges to
assure profitability and stability.6 °
Rastell and Pynson).
157. One letters patent to William Seres dated June 3, 1559 is a good exam-
ple. With standardized modern spelling, it states in part:
We be pleased to give this grant and by this presents for us our heirs
and Successors do... give and grant full power and authority privilege
and license unto our said loving Subject william Seres and to his as-
signs for and during the term of his natural life to imprint or cause to
be imprinted as well all manner of books ofprivate prayers usually and
commonly called or taken for primers as also of Psalters both in great
volumes and in small in Latin or English which now be or at any time
hereafter, shall be set forth and permitted .... Any other privilege or
any other order heretofore granted or taken to the contrary notwith-
standing Straightly inhibiting and forbidding all other our Subjects to
print utter or sell or cause to be printed uttered or sold any other book
or books of private prayers primers or psalters than such as shall be
the said William Seres or his assigns printed or caused to be printed
according to the true meaning of this our present privilege upon pain of
forfeiture of all such books as they shall imprint utter or sell contrary
to the meaning hereof. Wherefor we will command all our officers and
subjects as they tender our favor and will avoid our displeasure that
they and every of them if need require do aide and assist the said Wil-
liam Seres and his assigns in the due execution of this our license[.]
2 Arber, supra note 154, at 60-61 (capitalization, italics, and bolding in original).
158. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
159. See 1 Arber, supra note 154, at 114 (quoting Christopher Barker's Re-
port in December 1582 in the Stationers' Company books) (spelling standard-
ized).
160.
These considerations have enforced printers to procure grants from her
Majesty of some certain Copies, for the better maintenance of furniture,
Correctors, and other workmen, who cannot suddenly be provided, nor
suddenly put away: and if they should must of necessity, either want
necessary living, or print books, pamphlets, and other trifles, more
dangerous than profitable.
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There may have been several motivations for monarchs
to grant royal privileges, both in England and in other parts
of Europe. First, the English crown and other European gov-
ernments operated on a system of patronage and rewards.
The crown could reward its royal subjects with a valuable
right. In exchange, presumably, the crown could expect con-
tinued or increased loyalty."' Second, the crown became in-
creasingly concerned about the dangers of printing. Printers
had the means to produce and broadly disseminate views that
might be critical of the crown or the government, potentially
undermining the crown's credibility and shaping public atti-
tudes about the crown. Royal privileges may have been a
means of encouraging loyalty from printers and, to an extent,
controlling the content of what was printed. Finally, notwith-
standing the potential threat posed by printers, the crown
may have wanted to encourage the development of the young
publishing industry to the benefit of the public. Printing and
its ability to spread knowledge and encourage advances were
part of a developing, vibrant nation.'62 Seen in this light,
some measure of protection to ensure a reasonable return for
printers must have been appealing to the crown.
2. A Private Contractual Copyright-The
Station ers' Copyright
Even before the printing press, craftsmen involved in the
bookmaking and bookselling trades organized in England to
protect their interests. In 1357, there was a craft guild for
scriveners (those who copied text) and limners (those who il-
lustrated manuscripts) in London, referred to as the Brother-
hood of Manuscript Producers. 6 3 Later, in 1403, a guild for
1 Arber, supra note 154, at 115 (spelling standardized).
161. See MARK ROSE, AuTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
17 (1993) (discussing privileges as rewards to worthy individuals).
162. A document from the Stationers' Company to Parliament in 1643 made
the argument for valuing the press:
Sheweth, That the Mystery and Art of Printing is of publike and great
Importance, and ought to be held worthy of extraordinary regard and
consideration, in all well-govern'd States.... And in Europe the more
civill and knowing each Countrey is, the more carefully they provide for
the prosperity of this ingenius Craft ... for as Learning must needs
make us favour Printing, so Printing is a great means to advance
Learning amongst us.
1 Arber, supra note 154, at 584.
163. See BLAGDEN, supra note 103, at 22 (discussing 1357 guild);
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scriveners, limners, bookbinders, and booksellers was cre-
ated."M Those involved in the book trade, particularly print-
ers and booksellers, became known as "stationers,'' and by
about 1510, a voluntary association, or "Brotherhood of the
Stationers," was formed.6 6  This Brotherhood of Stationers
became officially recognized by a royal charter granted on
May 4, 1557,167 and was known as the Stationers' Company or
the Company of Stationers.
The Stationers' Company was significant because its
charter granted its members a near monopoly on printing in
England. The charter stated:
Besides we will, grant, ordain, and appoint for ourselves
and the successors of us the foresaid Queen that no person
within this our realm of England or the dominions of the
same shall practise or exercise ... the art or mistery of
printing any book or any thing for sale or traffic within
this our realm of England or the dominions of the same,
unless the same person at the time of his foresaid printing
is or shall be one of the community of the foresaid mistery
or art of Stationery of the foresaid City, or has therefore a
licence of us ... by the letters patent of us or the heirs or
successors of us the foresaid Queen. 16
Under the charter, the Stationers' Company was empowered
to establish "ordinances, provisions and statutes" to govern
WITTENBERG, supra note 30, at 9 (noting the founding of the Brotherhood of
Manuscript Producers in 1357).
164. See 1 Arber, supra note 154, at xxiii (reproducing text of the 1403 peti-
tion and grant); BLAGDEN, supra note 103, at 22-23 (discussing the 1403 guild);
WITTENBERG, supra note 30, at 10 (noting the founding in 1403 of the Craft of
Writers of Text-Letters).
165. The name "stationers" probably comes from the fact that early booksell-
ers sold manuscripts from stationary booths. BLAGDEN, supra note 103, at 21-
22.
166. See 1 Arber, supra note 154, at xix-xx (discussing the roots of the Sta-
tioners' Company); see also BLAGDEN, supra note 103, at 28 (noting that the
stationers first proposed their charter in 1542). Some suggest that the Com-
pany can be traced directly back to the 1403 guild. 3 JOHN NICHOLS, LITERARY
ANECDOTES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 545 (London, printed by author
1812) (citing a memorial presented by the Company in 1645 wherein it repre-
sents its existence for 240 years); 1 Arber, supra note 154, at xxii (quoting Nich-
ols).
167. See 1 Arber, supra note 154, at xxviii-xxxii (reproducing the text and
translation of the charter); BLAGDEN, supra note 103, at 19 (discussing the
charter).
168. 1 Arber, supra note 154, at xxx-xxxi (spelling in original).
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its members.'69 The monopoly, combined with the power to
govern its members, essentially allowed the Company to set
the rules for printing and publication.
With this authority, the Company established internal
rules that amounted to private copyrights. Before a work
could be published by a member of the Company, the "copy"
had to be entered in the register book of the Company by a
member of the Company.' The "copy," used in this context,
meant the original manuscript to be duplicated.' "Copy" or
"copye" also came to mean the property interest signifying the
right to print resulting from entry in the Company's register
or in short, the copyright itself.'72 As early as July 1555, even
prior to the Company's charter, there is an entry in the Com-
pany's books ordering Mr. Wallye to pay a fine for the offense
of "conselying of the pryntynge of a breafe Cronacle contrarey
to our ordenances before he Ded presente the Copye to the
wardyns."'' Once registered by one member of the Company,
no other member could publish the same work without the
permission of the member who registered the copy.' The re-
169. 1 id. at xxx (reproducing language of the charter, stating that the Com-
pany "for the good and sound rule and government" of the group could establish
"ordinances, provisions and statutes whenever it shall seem to them to be op-
portune and fit").
170. See 1 id. at 22, 26 (reproducing the Company rules and ordinances re-
quiring registration of copy prior to printing); see also, e.g.,1 id. at 74-79 (listing
the entries of "all suche copyes as be lycensed to be pryinted" from July 1557 to
July 1558).
171. See, e.g., RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY:
INTENDED FOR GENERAL USE AS WELL AS FOR GENTLEMEN OF THE PROFESSION
180 (London, printed by authors 1792) (defining copy as "the transcript of an
original writing"); 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 915 (2d ed. 1989) (defin-
ing copy as "[t]he original writing, work of art, etc. from which a copy is made"
or "[m]anuscript (or printed) matter prepared for printing").
172. See id. (identifying "property in 'copy' as copyright); see also, e.g., 1 Ar-
ber, supra note 154, at 199, 211 (listing receipts for "copyes" and recording
"[r]ecevyd of gyles godhed for the Copyes as foloweth").
173. 1 Arber, supra note 154, at 45; see also, e.g., 1 id. at 70 (noting payment
of a fine in 1557 for printing a book without a license from the wardens); see
also 1 id. at 71 (noting the payment of a fine in 1558 for printing a ballad with-
out a license). Arber states that the Company's first book containing entries
predating charter of the Company is likely evidence that earlier entries pre-
dating the charter were copied over from an earlier account book kept by the
Brotherhood. 1 id. at 33.
174. Rules of the Company stated that "by ancient Usage of this Company,
when any Book or Copy is duly Entered in the Register Book of this Company,
to any Member or Members of this Company, such Person to whom such Entry
is made, is, and always hath been reputed and taken to be Proprietor of such
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cords of the Company reflect that disputes over the right to
publication arose and were resolved internally,'75 and in many
cases resulted in fines against the offender.176 Before mem-
bers could bring any legal action, company ordinances from
1678 required members with disputes over the printing or
sale of any work to bring their complaints to the Company to
be heard and resolved.'7 7 Failure to bring a dispute to the
Company before filing an action resulted in a fine which was
to be paid to the Company.
178
Company membership consisted of printers, bookbinders,
booksellers, suppliers of paper, and a few others associated
with the book trade,'179 but did not include authors. Some
printers also sold the books they printed to the public and
hence were both printers and booksellers. Of those occupa-
tions in the Stationers' Company, initially the printers were
the most powerful, and they controlled the organization.
180
From the stationers' point of view, the Company was neces-
sary for three reasons: first, to protect their trade from poor
workmanship; second, to minimize unprofessional practices;
and third, notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, to
limit competition. Finally, the stationers expressed concern
that nonmembers of the Company were unqualified, ill
trained, and likely to produce poor quality work.' This same
argument was sometimes urged by the early Venetian print-
ers to justify grants of privileges to themselves. 82
Book or Copy, and ought to have the sole Printing thereof." 1 id. at 22. These
rules were printed in 1682, but as the language indicated, the registration and
publication system was the longstanding practice in the Company. Id. (describ-
inb the system as "ancient Usage of this Company"). Apparently, no copy of the
early ordinances and rules has survived. 1 Arber, supra note 154, at 3 ("All the
earlier manuscript Ordinances appear to have perished.").
175. See 1 Id. at 14 (citing the 1678 ordinance).
176. See, e.g., 1 id. at 23 (citing a 1681 ordinance fixing a penalty for publish-
ing another's copy); 1 id. at 184 (noting a fine in 1561 for printing "the booke of
husboundrybeynge master Totteles").
177. See 1 id. at 14 (providing language of the 1678 ordinance).
178. See 1 id. (identifying a fine often pounds).
179. See BLAGDEN, supra note 103, at 34.
180. See id. at 40 (stating that printers "dominated" the Company during its
first century of existence).
181. See 1 Arber, supra note 154, at 247 (complaining of an unskilled printer
who exhibited disordered behavior).
182. In one petition for a privilege, the author wrote that "by the culpable
negligence and ignorance of printers the texts of editions become every day
more corrupt, which thing is a dishonour and a public injury to this glorious
city." BROWN, supra note 110, at 56.
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In one letter expressing concern over the establishment
of a proposed press at Cambridge University, the wardens
183
of the Company expressed their concern over the "disordered
behavior of printers" generally and in particular the "unskill-
ful" master of the specific printing house." They further ex-
pressed concern over "the apprentices and other youths that
shall be brought up in that faculty there shall not be under
our government, and so careless of their behavior. '  In a
second letter concerning the same subject, the author ex-
plains that he granted a warrant to wardens of the Company
"to search and to stay" what purported to be University of
Cambridge presses, in part on the report that the owner was
"utterly ignorant in printing" and fear that work would be
done "by servants ... of the worst quality."'' 6 Perhaps ironi-
cally, members of the Company were prohibited from training
anyone except their own sons or bound apprentices of lawfully
authorized printers.'87 As evidence of rules addressing qual-
ity, there is an entry in the Company's register dating back to
December 1557, recording receipt of a fine assessed against a
member for binding books "in shepes lether / contrary to our
ordenaunces."8 8
The stationers were also concerned about what they con-
sidered unprofessional conduct that needed to be regulated.
According to a letter sent by the wardens of the Company in
1578, the Company was organized to address "the disorders
in printing ... to the end we might restrain many evils which
would have happened in the said profession," and further
notes the Company's "endless toil to withstand the lewd at-
tempts of many in our profession.' 89 The letter does not pro-
vide a complete explanation of what the "many evils and lewd
183. See JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH PUBLISHING 35 (1988). The
Company had an Upper Warden and an Under Warden who were elected offi-
cers of the Company. Id.
184. 1 Arber, supra note 154, at 247 (quoting Company Wardens' letter to the
Bishop of London, dated May 1583) (spelling standardized).
185. 1 id. (quoting Company Wardens' letter to the Bishop of London, dated
May 1583) (spelling standardized).
186. 1 id. at 246 (quoting a John London letter to the Bishop of London,
dated May 1583) (spelling standardized).
187. 1 id. at 16 (quoting the rules of the Company from 1678).
188. 1 id. at 70; see also, e.g., 1 id. at 100 (recording fines for binding books in
"shepes lether"); 1 Arber, supra note 154, at 158 (recording a fine for binding a
book in parchment contrary to orders of the Company).
189. 1 id. at 247 (spelling standardized).
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attempts" actually were; however, it is clear from other Com-
pany records that, among other things,9 ° the Company was
concerned about the publication of objectionable content19
and pirated editions of other printers' works.
Queen Mary I clearly granted the 1557 charter to control
the content being printed. The first paragraph of the charter
itself states the following purposes:
Know ye that we, considering and manifestly perceiving
that certain seditious and heretical books rhymes and
treatises are daily published and printed by divers scan-
dalous malicious schismatical and heretical persons, not
only moving our subjects and lieges to sedition and dis-
obedience against us, our crown and dignity, but also to
renew and move very great and detestable heresies
against the faith and sound catholic doctrine of Holy
Mother Church, and wishing to provide a suitable remedy
in this behalf. 19
The charter granted the Company the power to search print-
ing and bookselling establishments, to seize illegally printed
books, and to imprison violators.'93
The issue of "pirated" editions of works was a problem for
printers in England.' A printer relied upon sales of his work
to recoup his costs and make the enterprise profitable. If an-
other printer published the same work and placed the books
on the market before the earlier edition sold out, sales of the
original edition might be diminished. Moreover, the second
printer's preparation and printing costs could be substantially
190. Other "evil" conduct apparently included staying open on special holi-
days and on Sundays, see, e.g., 1 id. at 94, 124 (noting fines levied for staying
open and selling books on "festival day" and other fines levied for staying open
on Sundays), quarreling, see 1 id. at 100 (noting fine for contentious words over
conveyance of a copy), and for keeping a foreigner, see 1 id. at 101 (noting fine
in part "for kepynge of a forren[er]") (alteration in original); 1 id. at 123 (noting
a fine for maintaining a foreigner without presenting him according to the
Company's ordinances).
191. See 1 Arber, supra note 154, at 26 (noting that the Company's ordinance
is an attempt to prevent printing of"[t]reasonable, [s]editious, and [s]candalous"
materials); 1 id. at 247 (referring to dangers posed by some printers to the state
and religion).
192. 1 id. at xxviii (quoting an English translation of the charter).
193. See 1 id. at xxxi (outlining the powers the charter granted the Com-
pany).
194. See BLAGDEN, supra note 103, at 32 (discussing the problem of pirated
works by providing examples of printers such as Redman, Pynson, and Caxton).
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reduced by virtue of the first edition.9 A royal commission,
recognizing the potential economic impact of an unregulated
book trade, reported in 1583 "that the nature of bokes and
printing is such, as it is not meete, nor can be without their
vndoeinges of all sides, that sondrie men shold print one
boke." 19" This concern was addressed by the Company which
prohibited its members from printing a work when another
member had registered the work on the Company's register.'97
The Company's earliest records show numerous fines for
printing the works of other printers without permission.9
A third purpose for the Company was an anticompetitive
one. Members of the Company wanted to control the industry
and impose their own standards; they knew that stiff, un-
regulated competition was hurting their businesses. The
Company, with its nearly exclusive arrangement and rules,
could impose some stability by minimizing the proliferation of
printers and imposing standards on the competition. In a let-
ter dated 1583 to the Bishop of London, the Company war-
dens urged against the establishment of a new printing house
at the University of Cambridge. They argued that such a
press was "now less requisite than ever heretofore it was by
reason of the abundance of [printers already in [L]ondon."199
In a subsequent letter written by the Bishop of London, he re-
fers to the need to control the press, and he directs that or-
ders "should be devised and taken for restraining the exces-
sive number of printing presses.""°
These early private copyrights could be transferred by
sale, °' gift, or inheritance."2 The Company records document
195. Id.
196. Id. at 42 (citing State Papers Domestic Elizabeth, vol. 161, no. 1(c) July
18, 1583).
197. See 1 Arber, supra note 154, at 22 (noting that in the Company's ordi-
nances from 1681, the holder of a registered copy has the sole right to print the
work).
198. See i Id. at 101 (noting a fine for printing "another mans Copye by waye
of Desceate [deceit]"); 1 id. at 184 (noting a fine for printing "the booke of hus-
boundry beynge master Totteles"); 1 id. at 239 (noting a fine for "pryntinge of
other mens copyes").
199. See 1 id. at 247 (spelling standardized).
200. See 1 id. at 246 (quoting the June 1583 letter).
201. See BLAGDEN, supra note 103, at 44 ("[B]uying and selling of copies be-
came a frequent practice . . ").
202. See FEATHER, supra note 151, at 18 (recognizing transfers by purchase,
inheritance and gift).
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numerous instances of assignments of these early copy-
rights."' These private copyrights were of unlimited dura-
tion, although the Company allowed publication of works out
of print with payment of royalties to the owner of the copy-
right.2 °4
Through the ensuing years, the Company exercised its
powers and, with the willing assistance of the courts of the
Star Chamber, conducted searches and seizures of unauthor-
ized presses and publications. 20  During the sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries, the Star Chamber courts26 were
charged with enforcing the censorship laws. The Star Cham-
ber's decrees enjoyed the force of law, and its deliberations
and proceedings were conducted in secret, originally in a
chamber with stars painted on the ceiling (hence the name
Star Chamber). The Star Chamber, by its decrees of 1586
and 1637, reaffirmed the Company's powers and required the
registration of works in the Company's books prior to publica-
tion.0 7 These decrees are among the earliest English copy-
right laws. Professor Lyman Ray Patterson identifies the
Star Chamber Decrees of 1586 and 1637, the Ordinances of
1643 and 1649, and the Licensing Act of 1662 as copyright
acts predating the Statute of Anne in 17 10.20
8
203. See, e.g., 2 Arber, supra note 154, at 309, 325 (noting the 1577 recording
of a copy by Bamford and its later assignment to Jones); 2 id. at 312, 351 (noting
the 1577 recording of a copy by Jugge and the later 1579 entry reflecting a sale
to Jennings).
204. See 2 id. at 43, para. 5 (reproducing the text of the Company's order of
about 1588).
205. See 2 Arber, supra note 154, at 807-12 (providing the text of the Star
Chamber decree of June 23, 1586, which affirmed the Company's powers to
search and seize); NICHOLS, supra note 166, at 572 (noting an attempted search
by the Company of an "unruly" printer's printing house and its subsequent
complaint to the Court); id. at 573 (noting that in 1586, the Star Chamber af-
firmed the Company's powers to search bookbinders shops and printing offices
for unlawful or heretical books).
206. The court of the Star Chamber was "[a] court, chiefly of criminal juris-
diction, developed in the 15th c. from the judicial sittings of the King's Council
in the Star Chamber at Westminster." 16 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICT. 529 (2d
ed. 1989); see also PATTERSON, supra note 155, at 235 (discussing the "Court of
Star Chamber").
207. See 2 Arber, supra note 154, at 810 (prohibiting in the 1586 Decree the
printing of works not allowed by Queen or printing "contrary to any allowed or-
dinance set won for the good governance of the Company of Stationers") (Eng-
lish standardized); 4 id. at 529-30 (prohibiting in the 1637 Decree,the printing
of works unless lawfully licensed and entered into the register book of the Com-
pany of Stationers).
208. PATTERSON, supra note 155, at 12; see also Lyman Ray Patterson, The
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Thus, the Company, with the assistance of the Star
Chamber courts, achieved its goal of controlling the book
trade. By the same means, the government, with the help of
the Company, censored the press and limited dissemination
of objectionable materials."9 By the seventeenth century,
however, the Company's monopoly power and unholy alliance
with the Star Chamber courts became a political liability for
the Company. In 1640, Parliament abolished the unpopular
Star Chamber," ' but the Company continued to enjoy monop-
oly power over the printing and book industries under a se-
ries of ordinances and the Licensing Act of 1662.211 The Li-
censing Act required that all books be entered on the
Company's register, 212 and books could not be printed without
the consent of the copyright owner.213 Under the Act, anyone
building new printing presses or printing establishments had
to give notice to the Company. 14 The Company also retained
the power to search establishments and seize offending mate-
rials under the Act.215
The Licensing Act enjoyed a series of renewals until
Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 223, 227-28
(1966). Professor Patterson suggests that the ambiguous Star Chamber Decree
of 1566 might actually qualify as the first copyright act in England. Patterson,
supra, at 227-28 n. 18. But see Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29
WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1138 n.50 (1983) (disagreeing with Patterson and charac-
terizing the Statute of Anne as the first copyright statute since it was the first
statute expressly premised on author's rights).
209. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3 (1966)
(describing the "fellowship" where the stationers in exchange for trade advan-
tages played the part of "literary constables" for the Queen).
210. 16 Car. I, c. 10 (1640). The Act passed in 1640 abolished the Star
Chamber. Id.
211. The Licensing Act is also sometimes referred to as the Printing Act. See
LORD KING, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN LOCKE 204 (Garland Publishers
1972) (1884) (referring to the Printing Act); THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN
LOCKE AND EDWARD CLARKE 366-67 (Benjamin Rand ed., 1927) (referring to the
"Act for printing").
212. The statute stated: "That no private person or persons whatsoever shall
at any time hereafter print or cause to be printed any [b]ook or [p]amphlet
whatsoever unless the same [b]ook and [p]amphlet ... be first entered in the
Book of the Register of the Company of Statioiners of London. . . ." 14 Car. II.
c. 33 (1662) (spelling standardized) (capitalization altered). The statute pro-
vided for some exceptions.
213. Id.; see also Patterson, supra note 208, at 234 (noting that the Act re-
quired consent of the copyright owner).
214. 14 Car. II c. 33 (1662).
215. Id.
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1694, when Parliament refused to renew the Act.21 This re-
fusal was based in part on resentment of the bookselling mo-
nopoly that a few publishers had effectively obtained through
control of the Company and purchase of major copyrights.217
The House of Commons, in refusing to renew the Act, ob-
served that the stationers were "impowered to hinder the
printing [of] all innocent and useful Books; and have an Op-
portunity to enter a Title for themselves, and their Friends,
for what belongs to, and is the Labour and Right of, others."218
Moreover, the House of Commons objected to the Company's
powers to block book imports which drove up prices and lim-
ited access to valuable books,219 and objected to provisions al-
lowing searches of "all mens houses" "any time either by day
or night" upon suspicion "that there [were] unlicensed books
there.""22  Finally, the House of Commons objected to the
open-ended censorship provision which prohibited offensive
books without defining which books qualified as offensive.'
The famous English philosopher John Locke, whose writ-
ings later strongly influenced the framers of the Constitution,
was an important force in the defeat of the Licensing Act.222
He opposed the Act and the stationers' perpetual copyrights.
He strongly disliked the Stationers' Company and character-
ized the members as "dull wretches,"22' "lazy," and "igno-
rant."2 4 His objections were multifaceted, but his primary
concern was for free expression225 and public access to works.
216. See Patterson, supra note 208, at 238 n.72 (discussing the lapse of the
Licensing Act in 1694); ROSE, supra note 161, at 33 (stating that the Act expired
on May 3, 1695).
217. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF
COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 27 (1991).
218. 11 H.C. JOUR. 306 (point 3) (1695) (spelling standardized).
219. Id. (points 6-8).
220. Id. (point 16) (capitalization altered).
221. Id. (point 15).
222. See ROSE, supra note 161, at 32 (discussing Locke's efforts to defeat the
Act); see also Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright De-
bates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75,
78-79 (2003) (questioning whether the drafters of the Statute of Anne and later
jurists were aware of Locke's views on copyrights).
223. KING, supra note 211, at 204 (citing Locke's comments on the Licensing
or Printing Act in 1694).
224. Id. at 207 (providing Locke's comments on the Licensing or Printing Act
in 1694); THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE AND EDWARD CLARKE 366-67
(Benjamin Rand ed., 1927) (reprinting a letter to a member of parliament dated
Jan. 2, 1692 decrying "ignorant and lazy stationers").
225. See KING, supra note 211, at 203 (commenting on censorship provisions,
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He objected "[t]hat any person or company should have pat-
ents for the sole printing of ancient authors is very unreason-
able and injurious to learning." '226 Locke complained that un-
der the Act, the Stationers' Company seized high quality
imported books of classical authors, denying scholars the
benefit of them unless they paid a fee.22' Locke argued, at
least as to classical authors,
I demand whether, if another act for printing should be
made, it be not reasonable that nobody should have any
peculiar right in any book which has been in print fifty
years, but any one as well as another might have the lib-
erty to print it; for by such titles as these, which lie dor-
mant, and hinder others, many good books come quite to
be lost.2
Locke opposed perpetual copyrights as both harmful and
unreasonable, remarking,"of [t]his I am sure, it is very absurd
and ridiculous that any one now living should pretend to have
a propriety in, or a power to dispose of the propriety of any
copy or writings of authors who lived before printing was
known or used in Europe."29  Locke also advocated limited
duration copyrights for works of modern authors, and sug-
gested that "it may be reasonable to limit their property to a
certain number of years after the death of the author, or the
first printing of the book, as, suppose, fifty or seventy
years. 2 °
The Company lobbied for many years to regain its mo-
nopoly powers and trade restrictions but was ultimately un-
successful.2 3' Although the Company did not succeed in re-
covering its former powers, its efforts resulted in the passage
of the Statute of Anne in 1710, which imposed some regula-
noting that under the Act "it is impossible any book should pass but just what
suits their [the censors'] humours"); id. ("I know not why a man should not have
liberty to print whatever he would speak .... ").
226. Id. at 208; ROSE, supra note 161, at 33.
227. KING, supra note 211, at 204-05.
228. Id. at 205.
229. Id. at 208-09; see also THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE AND
EDWARD CLARKE 366-67 (Benjamin Rand ed., 1927) (reprinting a 1692, letter to
Edward Clarke, a close friend and member of Parliament, criticizing the sta-
tioners' monopoly on ancient authors).
230. KING, supra note 211, at 208.
231. See PATTERSON, supra note 155, at 138-42 (discussing the Company's
efforts to obtain new legislation); RANSOM, supra note 151, at 89-92 (discussing
efforts to obtain new legislation during the period from 1694 to 1710).
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tion on the book printing and selling trade and extended the
term of existing copyrights for twenty-one years.
III. STATUTE OF ANNE
A. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning
The Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, 232 is often referred
to as the first English copyright statute23 and is the direct
progenitor of American copyright law. The Statute of Anne
differed from the Star Chamber Decrees, Ordinances of the
Interregnum, and the Licensing Act in that it was neither a
censorship law nor defined by efforts to impose censorship-it
was a trade regulation law.
The failure to include censorship provisions in the Stat-
ute likely was not a concern for the stationers. In the past,
they had used the government's desire to impose censorship
to achieve their own objectives of monopoly control and pres-
ervation of valuable copyrights. The stationers were con-
cerned about these objectives of monopoly power and the pro-
tection of valuable copyrights when they lobbied for a new
statute to replace the Licensing Act. On December 12, 1709,
in submitting their bill to the House of Commons, the book-
sellers and printers complained that "diverse Persons have of
late invaded the Properties of others, by reprinting several
Books, without the Consent, and to the great Injury, of the
Proprietors, even to their utter Ruin, and the Discouragement
of all Writers in any useful Part of Learning.,
234
In the political climate of the times, censorship was un-
232. The Statute of Anne is sometimes referred to as the Act of 1709. Under
the old calendar, the new year in England began March 25 rather than January
1. The Act was enacted in what at the time was considered 1709, but is now
considered 1710. See PATTERSON, supra note 155, at 3 n.3 (discussing the en-
actment and change to the calendar); PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 208,
at 249 n.22 (discussing the enactment and change to the calendar). The Act was
generally effective April 10, 1710 (though one provision was effective March 25,
1710). See Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 §§ I, IV, V (1710) (Eng.).
233. See Abrams, supra note 208, at 1138 & n.50 (characterizing the Statute
of Anne as the first copyright statute). As noted earlier, this characterization is
not strictly correct. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. The earlier
English copyright enactments are most likely discounted because their copy-
right aspects were subservient to their primary censorship objectives, see
PATTERSON, supra note 155, at 143, and because prior laws did not recognize
copyright as an author's right, see Abrams, supra note 208, at 1138 n.50.
234. 16 H.C. JOUR. 240 (1709) (spelling standardized).
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popular with Parliament and would no longer serve as a vehi-
cle for the Company's control."' The stationers then began to
advocate the need for new protections unrelated to censorship
relying in part on the interests of authors as a justification."
The stationers, however, did not by any means attempt to
hide their own self-interest in advocating for new protections;
they wanted to protect what they considered to be their prop-
erty rights in valuable "Copies" which they had acquired from
authors.
The Statute itself had one stated overarching purpose:
the encouragement of learning. In its title the statute identi-
fies both the purpose and the means of achieving that pur-
pose, describing it as: "An act for the encouragement of learn-
ing, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or
purchasers of such copies, during the times therein men-
tioned., 23  In order to achieve the stated goal of encourage-
ment of learning, the Statute had to address two problems;
first, the injury caused by infringers who pirated works, and
second, the anticompetitive monopolies of the publishers and
booksellers. The Statute of Anne itself specifically identified
the first of these problems in its introductory lines:
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of
late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting,
and publishing, or causing to be printed, reprinted, and
published, books and other writings, without the consent
of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings, to
their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of
them and their families: for preventing therefore such
235. See ROSE, supra note 161, at 31-32 (discussing the rise of sentiment
against censorship).
236. Professor Benjamin Kaplan stated his opinion of the stationers position:
"I think it nearer the truth to say that publishers saw the tactical advantage of
putting forward authors' interests together with their own. . . ." BENJAMIN
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 8 (1966); see also PATTERSON &
LINDBERG, supra note 217, at 27-28 (discussing a ploy to use authors' interests).
237. When the stationers presented their bill-the basis for the Statute of
Anne-to the House of Commons in 1709, they advocated for it by explaining:
it has been the constant usage, for the Writers of Books, to sell their
Copies to Booksellers, or Printers, to the end they might hold those
Copies as their Property, and enjoy the Profit of making, and vending,
Impressions of them;... And praying, that Leave may be given to
bring in a Bill for securing to them the Property of Books, bought and
obtained by them.
16 H.C. JOUR. 240 (1709) (spelling standardized).
238. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.) (spelling standardized).
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practices for the future, and for the encouragement of
239learned men to compose and write useful books ....
The second of these problems, the anticompetitive monopo-
lies, is not specifically identified in the Statute but is directly
addressed by its provisions.24°
To attack the problem of piracy of works, the Statute of
Anne adopted a philosophical shift from the prior stationers'
copyright to the author's statutory copyright. Mark Rose, in
his book Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyrights,
explains the situation of authors prior to the Statute of Anne:
In the seventeenth century, then, there may have been
some feeling that authors should have the right to control
the first publication of their writings. But in England at
any rate no clearly defined set of authorial rights existed,
and English authors had no obvious form of redress if
books were published without their permission.24'
Just prior to the adoption of the Statute of Anne, promi-
nent writers like Daniel Defoe 242 and Joseph Addison 243 urged
this philosophical embrace of authors' rights.144 Defoe advo-
cated for statutory protection of authors' rights. 45  In his
view, an author's book or writing was his property. "A Book
is an Author's Property, 'tis the Child or his Inventions, the
Brat of his Brain; if he sells his Property, it then becomes the
Right of the Purchaser ... ,,246 Defoe lamented the problem of
literary piracy and concluded that an act of Parliament was
needed "so Property of Copies may be secur'd to Laborious
Students, to the Encouragement of Letters and all useful
239. Id.
240. See infra notes 274-82 and accompanying text (discussing how the Stat-
ute of Anne addressed monopolies).
241. ROSE, supra note 161, at 25.
242. Defoe was a prominent English writer who is known as the father of
modern journalism. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 24, at 20
(noting that Defoe's works included ROBINSON CRUSOE).
243. Addison was a writer and statesman who held a seat in Parliament from
1708 until his death in 1719. Id. at 20.
244. See ROSE, supra note 161, at 35-41 (discussing Addison and Defoe's
writings urging recognition and protection of authors' property rights).
245. See FACSIMILE TEXT Soc'Y, 6 DEFOE'S REVIEW 363 (1938) (reprinting
original document dated Nov. 3, 1709 that argued for a law to protect authors
and complaining of failure to pass a bill). Defoe also understood the need for
protection of editors as well. See id. at 404 (reprint of original dated Nov. 26,
1709) (urging a law "encouraging Learning, Arts, and Industry, by securing the
Property of Books to the Authors or Editors of them").
246. Id. at 515 (reprinting original document dated Feb. 2, 1710).
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Studies. '24 Concerning one effort prior to the Statute of Anne
to secure protection for copyrights, in a letter dated March 25,
1707, Defoe wrote to Secretary of State Robert Harley:2 48 "I
hear the Bill for Secureing the Right of printed Coppyes is
stopt. I beg of you Sir in your Respect to Encouragemt of Let-
ters and Dilligence in Learning to give it your help."249 Again
in 1709, just prior to the adoption of the Statute of Anne, De-
foe wrote of the public benefit that would come from protec-
tion of authors' rights. 2" He claimed that failure to protect
authors' rights resulted in "a Discouragement to Industry, a
Dishonour to Learning, and a Cheat upon the whole Na-
tion."2 5' Defoe explained that if, because of a lack of copyright
protection, authors are unable to make money through sale or
publication of their works, then authors have a disincentive
to publish, and both the authors and the buying public are
cheated.52
His interest in the protection of authors' rights was quite
personal. Defoe complained of "pirate printers" who abridged,
corrupted, and reprinted everything he wrote. 52 In 1703, two
pirated editions of one of Defoe's works were published and
according to Defoe, cost him £1,500.254 Defoe complained that
as soon as an author publishes his work, a "raskally f]ellow"
buys it, reprints it, and undersells the original edition.25  He
objected that "[t]his is down-right robbing on the High-way,
247. 5 Id. at 424 (reprinting original document dated Nov. 8, 1705) (spelling
standardized).
248. Robert Harley was Speaker of the House of Commons, Secretary of
State, and later Earl of Oxford and Lord Treasurer. THE LETTERS OF DANIEL
DEFOE vi (George Harris Healey ed., 1969).
249. Id. at 212 (reprinting letter 100, dated Mar. 25, 1707).
250. To be certain, Defoe's concern was not merely for the public benefit. He
also was concerned about the rights of authors and their families to benefit from
their ideas and labors. See, e.g., 6 FACSIMILE TEXT SOC'Y, supra note 245, at
363 (reprint of original dated Nov. 3, 1709) (discussing defense of property and
authors' right to be compensated).
251. Id. (spelling standardized).
252. Id. at 531-32 (reprinting original document dated Feb. 11, 1710).
253. WILLIAM L. PAYNE, THE BEST OF DEFOE'S REVIEW: AN ANTHOLOGY 209
(1951) (quoting 3 Review, No. 16, Feb. 5, 1706).
254. See PAULA R. BACKSCHEIDER, DANIEL DEFOE: HIS LIFE 190-93 (1989)
(discussing poem Jure Divino).
255. DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY ON THE REGULATION OF THE PRESS 27 (Ox-
ford, Blackwell 1704) (Luttrell Reprints No. 7 1948); accord 5 FACSIMILE TEXT
SOC'Y, supra note 245, at 424 (reprinting original document dated Nov. 8, 1705)
(complaining about "a Pyrate Printer, [who] Reprints his Copy immediately, and
Sells it for a quarter of the Price").
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Defoe argued for the Statute of Anne and applauded its
impact. '  In 1712, he made reference to copyrights "which
are estates to many families, and to preserve which right
from piracy and invasion, a very just and necessary law was
made last Parliament, the advantage of which is happily
found in many cases since." '258
The writer and statesman Joseph Addison259 also called
for protection of authors' rights. He lamented that an author
"has no Property in what he is willing to produce, but is ex-
posed to Robbery and Want, with this melancholy and just
Reflection, That he is the only Man who is not protected by
his Country, at the same Time that he best deserves it.
260
Addison decried the conduct of literary pirates whom he
characterized as "rogues within the law," "miscreants,"
"wretches," "rascals, plunderers, robbers, [and] highway-
men."261 These pirates, he explained, "print any Book, Poem,
or Sermon, as soon as it appears in the World, in a smaller
Volume, and sell it (as all other Thieves do stolen Goods) at a
cheaper Rate.""2 2 In discussing one author, Addison compared
the author's brain to other men's land: "His Brain, which is
his Estate, had a regular and different Produce as other
Men's Land."263 Addison supported the Statute of Anne and
argued for recognition of authors' rights as property to be pro-
tected from infringers.2
256. DEFOE, supra note 255, at 27. On another occasion, in 1709, Defoe com-
plained of booksellers' conduct: "The Practice is the Shame and Scandal of the
present Time-and gives a Liberty to daily Invasions of Property equal in Vil-
lany, to robbing a House, or plundering an Hospital." 6 FACSIMILE TEXT SOC'Y,
supra note 245, at 363 (1938) (reprint of original dated Nov. 3, 1709). On yet
another occasion, he complained of "the open Robberies and Depredations of
Printers and Pyratic Booksellers." Id. at 419 (reprint of original dated Dec. 6,
1709). Upon reading Mr. Defoe's writing about the state of the printing indus-
try, one might exclaim: "Yes, Mr. Defoe, now tell us how you really feel!"
257. See FACSIMILE TEXT SOC'Y, supra note 245, at 531 (reprinting of original
document dated Feb. 11, 1710) (arguing for the passage of the Statute of Anne).
258. PAYNE, supra note 253, at 80 (quoting 3 Review, No. 2, Mar. 29, 1711).
259. Addison was a writer and statesman who held a seat in Parliament from
1708 to his death in 1719. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 24, at 20.
260. 2 THE TATLER 121-22 (Donald R. Bond ed., 1987) (1709).
261. Id. at 120.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 121.
264. See John Feather, The Book Trade in Politics: The Making of the Copy-
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The stationers also recognized that protection of authors'
copyrights-and by extension their own valuable copyrights-
would serve an important public interest. Piracy of literature
injured the proprietors of "copies" and resulted in "the Dis-
couragement of all Writers in any useful Part of Learning."265
The booksellers argued that without protection of copyrights,
the book trade would be ruined and the public would suffer
accordingly. 6
The Statute of Anne is significant for its recognition of
copyright as an author's right and for opening up the copy-
right registration process to nonmembers of the Company.267
The stationers' copyright was primarily a printer's right, and
in fact only members of the Company could obtain them. Au-
thors, as such, did not qualify for membership in the Com-
pany and technically were not entitled to hold the stationers'
copyrights.6 8 There were isolated instances of authors who
received copyrights for their own works and other instances of
members of the Company who recorded the copyrights on be-
half of non-members of the Company,6 9 but this avenue was
not available to authors as a matter of right. The Statute of
Anne changed all that.
Under the Statute, authors of books or other writings not
already under existing stationers' copyrights... and their as-
signees had "the sole liberty of printing and reprinting" their
books and anyone who printed such works or sold infringing
books without consent violated the Statute.27 ' Furthermore,
the Statute required entry of the title of the protected books
in the register book of the Company. The register book was
right Act of 1710, in 8 PUBL'G HISTORY 19, 38 (1980) (noting that "Addison had
been involved in the debates on the 1710 Copyright Bill, which he had sup-
ported on the grounds that authors ought to be protected").
265. 16 H.C. JOUR. 240 (1709) (spelling standardized).
266. See Feather, supra note 264, at 19, 34 (giving booksellers' arguments in
favor of the new bill).
267. PATTERSON, supra note 155, at 147 (suggesting that the use of authors'
interests was primarily a weapon to attack the stationers' monopoly and was
really more a matter of "form than of substance"). He discounts the suggestion
that Parliament primarily intended to benefit authors. Id. at 145-46.
268. Id. at 5.
269. See id. at 65-66 (citing examples from the Company's register).
270. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.) (allowing owners of exist-
ing stationers' copyrights, be they authors, booksellers, printers, or others, to
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required to be available to any person for inspection. If the
clerk of the Company refused to make an entry, an author or
other owner of the copy could achieve the same result by ad-
vertisement in the Gazette and the clerk would be fined.272 In
a further significant development, the Statute returned a
copyright to the author, if living, upon the expiration of the
initial fourteen-year term for a second fourteen-year term.7
By shifting the focus of copyright to authors, and opening the
process to authors (and others who might receive copyrights
from authors), the Statute of Anne addressed authors' con-
cerns about piracy.
The second problem, that of booksellers' monopoly power,
is addressed by the Statute in several ways. First, it opened
up ownership and registration of copyrights to nonmembers
of the Company.274 Second, it required access to the Com-
pany's register book by any person with a legitimate pur-
pose.275 Third, it allowed challenges to unreasonably high
prices for books and permitted specified authorities to "reform
or redress" the price "according to the best of their judg-
ments."276 Fourth, it required the deposit of nine copies of
each work for use in specified national libraries.7 Fifth, it
expressly stated that the Statute did not prohibit importation
or sale of books in Greek, Latin, or other foreign languages
published abroad. 78 Finally, it provided that after the initial
term of the copyright, the copyright returned to the author for
an additional term. 9
The Statute also attacked monopolies by limiting the
term of copyrights. Existing stationers' copyrights would be
enforceable for twenty-one years "and no longer., 280 Unpub-
lished books or books composed after the Statute would enjoy
a copyright term of fourteen years "and no longer," commenc-
272. Id. § III.
273. Id. § XI.
274. Id. §§ I-III.
275. Id. § III.
276. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § IV (1710) (Eng.). There is no evidence
that this price control provision was ever invoked, but perhaps it had a prophy-
lactic effect by discouraging would-be offenders. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra
note 217, at 29. The provisions for price control were abandoned in 1739. See
12 Geo. 2, c. 36 (1739).
277. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § V (1710) (Eng.).
278. Id. § VII.
279. Id. § XI.
280. Id. § I.
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ing at first publication,81 with an additional fourteen-year
term for the author if the author was then living.2 '82 The
added emphatic words "and no longer," make clear the Stat-
ute's intent that copyright terms be finite. The Statute in-
tended ultimately to end existing copyrights, and limit the
duration of future copyrights. The limited terms under the
Statute contrasted with the perpetual term enjoyed under
stationers' copyrights would free up works for general use in
the future.
The important point is this: the Statute of Anne, the an-
cestor of American copyright law, had as its foremost objec-
tive the encouragement of learning-a general public inter-
est-not the private economic interests of authors, printers,
or publishers.283 It did have a secondary interest for the eco-
nomic security of authors and other proprietors of books and
writings, but this secondary concern was driven by the impact
that the void of regulation had upon the creation of "useful
books. '''
The public benefit objective is indicated by the language
of the Statute and by its design. Its title begins that it is "an
Act for the Encouragement of Learning."8 Its statement of
purpose announces that it was "for the encouragement of
learned men to compose and write useful books." '86 Its term
of years and emphatic language "and no longer," '87 limited the
term of copyrights. After expiration of the statutory copy-
right, the work entered the public domain and was available
to others.288 Its provisions made copyright available to au-
thors and other proprietors of books and otherwise under-
mined the stationers' monopoly.
Removing obstacles to publication served the public pur-
281. Id.
282. Id. § XI.
283. John Feather discounts the public purpose motive. He concludes that
the Statute of Anne "is essentially concerned with the protection of the rights of
certain members of the book trade, and to a far lesser extent those of the buyers
and readers of books, with a token gesture towards the good of society at large."
FEATHER, supra note 151, at 5.
284. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.).
285. Id. (title).
286. Id. § I.
287. Id.
288. The Statute did not use the term "public domain" or address what hap-
pened after the copyright expired, but this is the logical and necessary result of
the Statute's limited term copyrights. See id.
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pose of generating more works for public use. This was ac-
complished by opening up the copyright registration process
and by requiring open access to the records. The open records
helped to avoid innocent infringement and to facilitate obtain-
ing permission to publish from copyright owners, while the
Statute's price control provisions, at least in theory,289 pro-
tected consumers from price gouging and made works more
available to consumers. The deposit requirements for na-
tional libraries allowed access to the works by scholars and
others. Also, the import provision made clear that, unlike the
expired Licensing Act and prior laws, the Statute was not in-
tended to block book imports.
As with virtually all legislation, there may have been
other unspoken motives and purposes for the statute in the
minds of some of its proponents. Nonetheless, there is no
reason to assume that the statute's authors and supporters
did not mean what they said nor intend the result that fol-
lowed. Indeed, many of these public policy concerns-a desire
to end monopolies and increase availability of printed
works-were also the basis of the rejection of the Licensing
Act several years earlier.29 °
One early source from 1735 reported that the Statute of
Anne had the desired public interest results of encouraging
learning and economic activity:
By this Act, learned Men have been incited to write and
compile many Books, from whence the Publick has not
only received the Advantages arising from useful Knowl-
edge, but has laid the Foundation of a Property now be-
come very valuable, and of a Manufacture which employs
great Number of Hands, and is attended with many Ad-
vantages.
291
289. There is no evidence that the price control provision was ever invoked.
It was ultimately repealed. See supra note 276.
290. See supra notes 216-30 (discussing reasons for rejection of the Licensing
Act and Locke's reasons for opposing renrewal of the Licensing Act).
291. FARTHER REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FOR MAKING MORE EFFECTUAL AN ACT,
PASSED IN THE EIGHTH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN
ANNE, INTITLED, AN ACT FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING, BY VESTING
THE COPIES OF PRINTED BooKs IN THE AUTHORS OR PURCHASERS OF SUCH




B. Common Law Copyzight: We Never Knew You
1. The Concept of Common Law Copyright
The stationers and, in particular, those owners of sta-
tioners' copyrights found a temporary reprieve in the Statute
of Anne, which reaffirmed and extended the terms of valuable
extant non-statutory stationers' copyrights for a term of
twenty-one years "and no longer."292 After the dust settled
and as the new statutory terms for copyrights began to run
out, copyright owners (primarily booksellers) continued their
battle to extend copyright protection. Their theory was that
in addition to the limited-term statutory copyright afforded
by the Statute of Anne, authors, and more importantly, their
assignees possessed enforceable common law copyrights in
perpetuity.
Legal scholars and historians have long debated whether
a separate common law copyright, distinct from the Statute of
Anne, existed in eighteenth-century England.9 To get to the
bottom of this debate, the meaning of common law copyright
must be understood. A common law right is a right based on
general or local customs rather than written law. These
common law rights were rooted in custom or usage, enforced
or "discovered" by common law courts, and revealed in re-
ported judicial decisions.294 According to one nineteenth cen-
tury treatise on the laws of England, common law rights "re-
ceive[d] their binding power, and the force of laws, by long
and immemorial usage, and by their universal reception
throughout the kingdom."29 The custom giving rise to the
common law right must be ancient; "IT]he goodness of a cus-
tom depends upon its having been used time out of mind...
time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the con-
trary."
29 6
292. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.).
293. For a good discussion of the issue by a proponent of the view supporting
the existence of common law copyright, see John F. Whicher, The Ghost of
Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry into the Constitutional Distribution ofPowers
over the Law of Literary Property in the United States-Part , 9 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 102 (1962).
294. 1 BROOM & HADLEY, supra note 10, at 43.
295. Id. at 40.
296. Id at 41. But see THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 307 (5th ed. 1956) ("In so far as this phrase implies that cus-
tom is or ought to be immemorially old it is historically inaccurate" and finding
2004
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Common law copyright in the context of this debate is not
what modern copyright lawyers have typically referred to as
common law copyrights. Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act,
courts and lawyers recognized common law copyright as the
copyright that attached to an author's work at the time of the
work's creation but prior to its general publication. 97 Statu-
tory copyright did not attach until general publication of the
work.2 9 Exercising their common law copyrights, authors
could prevent appropriation or unauthorized publication of
their works indefinitely so long as federal statutory copyright
protection did not attach.2 9 The 1976 Copyright Act altered
the earlier copyright law scheme and no longer required pub-
lication. Instead, federal statutory copyright attached upon
creation,"' which required fixation in a tangible medium of
expression. 01 The 1976 Copyright Act specifically preempted
common law rights for works that fell within the Act's
scope.02 Common law copyright continues to hold a place un-
der the 1976 Act 33 but that place is a small one claiming do-
minion only over works that remain unfixed. 4
Protection for unpublished manuscripts was not the per-
petual common law copyright intended by the stationers of
the eighteenth century.30' Their concern was perpetual com-
"there was much less insistence upon actual or fictitious antiquity").
297. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 657 (1834) (noting "that an au-
thor, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain redress
against any one who deprives him of it... cannot be doubted"); Estate of Martin
Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 1999) (dis-
cussing common law copyright under the 1909 Act); Estate of Hemingway v.
Random House, 244 N.E.2d 250, 254 (N.Y. 1968) ( stating that "[c]ommon-law
copyright is the term applied to an author's proprietary interest in his literary
or artistic creations before they have been made generally available to the pub-
lic.").
298. See, e.g., Estate ofMartin Luther King, Jr., 194 F.3d at 1214.
299. See Copyright Act of 1909 § 2, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909) (preserving
common law remedies for unpublished works).
300. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
301. See id. §§ 101, 102 (defining creation and works).
302. Id. § 301(a).
303. See id. § 301(b) (preserving common law remedies in specific circum-
stances).
304. Examples of unfixed works to which common law copyright might apply
would be choreography that is not filmed or notated, an extemporaneous speech,
or an unwritten, unrecorded musical composition developed from memory. See
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5747.
305. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 657 (regarding an author's right to his
manuscript, "[T]hat is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual
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mon law copyright affording control of a work beyond publica-
tion and beyond the Statute of Anne's provided term.0 6
2. Rejection of Common Law Copyright in Great Britain
Perhaps the first hint of an argument for the existence of
common law copyrights came from arguments made by book-
sellers pressing for legislation in 1710. According to John
Feather, the booksellers argued that their version of the copy-
right bill confirmed common law rights but maintained that
common law rights were insufficient.0 7 In 1735, in an effort
to extend the term of the Statute of Anne, sponsors of the Bill
argued that before the Statute of Anne, "Authors were
deemed to have an absolute Right in their Composions ... to
be preserved to Themselves and their Assignes," and cited for
support the fact that the "eminent Lawyer, the late Lord
Chief Justice Coke, [ I] by his Will devised to his Posterity the
Right of Reprinting all the Books which he wrote."0 8
Professor Howard Abrams argues persuasively that no
common law copyright existed prior to the Statute of Anne.0 9
He contends that no precedent prior to the Statute of Anne
recognized common law copyright aside from unreported, un-
contested ex parte chancery cases granting preliminary in-
junctions.310
In 1769, Millar v. Taylor became the first case to face the
issue squarely and recognize common law copyright in pub-
lished works.31' The issue of perpetual common law copyright
had been presented earlier in Tonson v. Collins,31' but Tonson
was never decided. At issue in Tonson was the defendant's
publication of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele's Spectator,
and exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the author
shall have published it to the world").
306. See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 202 (K.B. 1769) (stating argu-
ments of plaintiff that "there is a real property remaining in authors, after pub-
lication of their works" and such right "is a common law right, which always has
existed, and does still exist").
307. See Feather, supra note 264, at 34 (giving booksellers' arguments in fa-
vor of the new bill).
308. FARTHER REASONS, supra note 291, at 1.
309. See Abrams, supra note 208, at 1138-47 (discussing the history of com-
mon law copyright).
310. Seeid. at 1142-43.
311. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 201.
312. 96 Eng. Rep. 169 (K.B. 1761); Tonson v. Collins, 96 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B.
1762).
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first published in 1711.' 3 The judges refused to proceed with
the case after they discovered that the parties had colluded in
an effort to obtain precedent supporting common law copy-
right. Justice Willes in Millar explained:
[U]pon certain informations received by the Judges, "that
the whole was a collusion; that the defendant was nominal
only; and the whole expence [sic] paid by the plaintiff;"
they refused to proceed in the cause .... They thought,
this contrivance to get a collusive judgment was an at-
tempt of a dangerous example, and therefore to be dis-
couraged . 14
In Tonson v. Collins, no less than Sir William Blackstone
himself argued the case for the plaintiff, and Yates argued for
the defendant."5
The holding in Millar v. Taylor recognized a perpetual
common law copyright, but the holding was only a short-lived
victory for the proponents of common law copyright. In
Donaldson v. Beckett, decided just a few years later in 1774,
the House of Lords reversed the lower courts and overruled
Millar.316 The ultimate holding and rationale of Donaldson is
obscure as a result of the appellate process and practices of
the time. The case was finally decided by a vote in the House
of Lords following non-binding advisory opinions written by
eleven judges from the courts of Common Pleas, Exchequer,
and King's Bench. According to Professor Abrams, the opin-
ions of the judges were erroneously cited in America as con-
trolling, and on top of that, the opinions were misunderstood
and misreported."7 These American courts and authorities
incorrectly understood the opinions to find, based on a 6-5
split, that a perpetual copyright at common law existed but
was preempted by the Statute of Anne.318 Professor Abrams
313. Tonson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 169. Interestingly, Addison during his life had
been a supporter of authors' rights and the Statute of Anne. See supra notes
259-64 and accompanying text (discussing Addison's support of author's rights
and the Statute of Anne).
314. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 214.
315. Tonson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 180.
316. Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 847 (H.L. 1774).
317. Abrams, supra note 208, at 1164-71 & n.189.
318. Id. at 1164 & n.189; see also Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 655-56 (discussing
opinions in Donaldson); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Emil Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284,
291 (1907) ("[A] majority of the judges, while in favor of the common law right,
held the same had been taken away by the statute."); Sarony v. Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co., 17 F. 591, 593 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883) (stating that English
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concludes that a majority of the judges supported the exis-
tence of common law copyright and did not believe that the
Statute of Anne preempted the right.319 Accounts of the de-
bate in the House of Lords prior to its vote, however, reveal
the Lords' strong antipathy to the existence of perpetual
common law copyright.32°
Defoe, an author and supporter of the Statute of Anne,
did not acknowledge any kind of enforceable recognized com-
mon law right that predated the Statute of Anne. In urging
the need for a statute he makes clear his view that there was
no remedy available in England to authors whose works were
pirated. He did not complain about limited but ineffective
common law protection; he gave no hint of any existing reme-
dies. In 1709, he wrote concerning "the open Robberies and
Depredations of Printers and Pyratic Booksellers":
In a well govern'd Nation as this is, it was never known,
that open Robbery should be allow'd .... without any
Punishment .... When in this Case a Man has his Goods
stollen, his Pocket pick'd, his Estate ruin'd, his Prospect of
Advantage ravish'd from him, after infinite Labour, Study,
and Expence, and has no Remedy, no Justice to fly to--no
Court to have Satisfaction in, nor any Method to prevent
it .... 321
Blackstone, in his first edition of Commentaries on the
Laws of England in 1766, acknowledged that there was no
"direct determination upon the right of authors at the com-
mon law."3 22 Citing decisions from chancery courts and legis-
lative recognition of copyrights, Blackstone favored the exis-
tence of common law copyright. 23 His favorable disposition
courts had recognized perpetual common law copyright), affd 111 U.S. 53
(1884).
319. Abrams, supra note 208, at 1166.
320. See id. at 1161 ("The text of the Lords' statements reveals, an emphatic
and total rejection of the notion of common law copyright."); id. at 1161-64 (dis-
cussing House of Lords' debate).
321. 6 FACSIMILE TEXT SOC'Y, supra note 245, at 419 (reprint of original
dated Nov. 3, 1709). But see 1 id. at 295 (reprint of original dated Nov. 4, 1704)
(stating in column entitled "Advice from the Scandal Club" in response to a let-
ter complaining about piracy of a work that the Proprietor should "take his
Remedy at Law") (spelling standardized).
322. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, ESQ., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 406 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1766).
323. Id. at 407 ("But much may be gathered from the frequent injunctions of
the court of chancery, prohibiting the invasion of this property .. "; "Much
may also be collected from the several legislative recognitions of copy-
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was no surprise because Blackstone was legal counsel for the
plaintiffs in both Tonson and Millar, in which he argued for
the existence of common law copyright.14  By the time the
Donaldson decision was rendered, Blackstone was a justice on
the Court of Common Pleas, and he issued an opinion sup-
porting the existence of common law copyright.32 In later edi-
tions of the Commentaries, Blackstone acknowledged the
holdings in Millar and Donaldson."6
Whatever may have been the case prior to the Statute of
Anne, after the 1774 ruling of the House of Lords in
Donaldson v. Beckett, it was settled that the Statute of Anne
had preempted such a common law right, if it ever had ex-
isted.32
7
IV. UNDERSTANDING OF COPYRIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
A. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution
1. Early State Copyright Laws
In 1783 in the United States, various states began to
pass copyright laws328 due in large part to the efforts of Noah
Webster329 and other like-minded individuals.33 ° The Conti-
rights.... .") (spelling standardized).
324. See Tonson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 180; Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 201.
325. Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. at 847.
326. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 322, at 407 & n.h (citing Millar and
Donaldson).
327. Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. at 837.
328. See HARRY R. WARFEL, NOAH WEBSTER: SCHOOLMASTER TO AMERICA
54-58 (1936) (discussing Webster's efforts to obtain copyright legislation in vari-
ous states); id. at 58 (arguing that "Webster unquestionably is the father of
copyright legislation in America."); Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the
US. Constitution: Why Did the Framers Include It with Unanimous Approval,
36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 370-74 (1992) (discussing Webster's efforts to obtain
copyright protection). But see BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN
PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAw 110, 123 (1967) (questioning the actual impact of
Webster's efforts; concluding that "the share of accomplishment which he
claimed for himself shrinks in light of the evidence").
329. See NOAH WEBSTER, LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER 1, 5, 8, 57 (Harry R.
Warfel ed., 1953) (providing copies of correspondence requesting passage of
copyright acts in Connecticut, New York, and Virginia, and summarizing copy-
right laws passed in the various states). Webster was motivated by a desire to
protect his spelling and grammar book, The Grammatical Institute of the Eng-
lish Language, known as the "Blue-backed Speller." See, e.g., id. at 9 (referring
to the Grammatical Institute and efforts to obtain copyright protection for it).
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nental Congress encouraged the process. In a letter to the
President of Congress dated January 10, 1783, Joel Barlow, 
331
Webster's classmate at Yale, friend and fellow author, urged
the Congress to encourage the states to pass copyright legis-
lation. 32 In his letter, Barlow relied upon the public benefit
rationale; he maintained that copyright was "a subject in
which... the interest & honor of the Public is very much con-
cerned.333  He referred to the need to provide "encourage-
ment" "to the exertions of genius" to "dignify the manners of a
nation."'334 But Barlow also strongly relied upon the property
right view. "There is certainly no kind of property ... so
much his own, as the works which a person originates from
his creative imagination ... it is a principle of natural justice
that he should be entitled to the profits arising from the sale
,,335
of his works ....
The Continental Congress complied with Barlow's re-
quest. According to its own record, the Continental Congress
was prompted to action by "sundry papers and memorials
from different persons."336 With the active support and par-
ticipation of James Madison, on May 2, 1783, the Continental
Congress adopted a resolution which "recommended" that the
individual states enact laws to protect copyrights for not less
than fourteen years.3 7 James Madison also helped Webster
330. See BUGBEE, supra note 328 at 110-11 (attributing adoption of early
state copyright laws to efforts of Noah Webster and Joel Barlow).
331. For a biography of Joel Barlow, an early American poet and writer, in-
cluding information on his friendship with Noah Webster, see generally
CHARLES BURR TODD, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOEL BARLOW (London, G.P. Put-
nam's Sons 1886).
332. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 4 PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-
1789 at No. 78, folio 369 (1971), reprinted in part in BUGBEE, supra note 328, at
111-12.
333. Id.
334. Id. ("Indeed we are not to expect to see any works of considerable magni-
tude, (which must always be works of time and labor) offered to the Public till
[sic] such security is given.").
335. Id. (maintaining also a copyright was "a subject in which.., the interest
& honor of the Public is very much concerned").
336. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 326 (Gail-
lard Hunt ed., 1922) [hereinafter CONTINENTAL CONGRESS JOURNALS].
337. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 1-21 (Bulletin No. 3, Rev.
1973) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS] (reprinting resolutions);
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS JOURNALS, supra note 336, at 326-27 (reporting text of
resolution from the committee and noting that Madison was one of the three
members of the committee reporting the resolution).
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obtain passage of copyright legislation in Virginia.338 Between
1783 and 1786, twelve of the states adopted copyright stat-
utes; only Delaware did not.339
The terms of the copyrights granted by the states varied.
Seven states provided for two fourteen-year terms;3 4° North
Carolina provided for one fourteen-year term;3 4' New Hamp-
shire provided for one twenty-year term;3 42 and three states
provided for one twenty-one-year term. 43 The statutes of
Maryland and Pennsylvania were only to become effective af-
ter all states had passed similar copyright laws.3" Several
states refused to extend protection to citizens of other states if
the citizen's home state did not provide similar copyright pro-
tections.345 Most of the statutes required registration of the
copyright with an appropriate designated state authority.
34 6
The state copyright statutes generally recognized two in-
terests promoted by copyright law: the personal property in-
terest of authors and the public interest of the advancement
of learning. The first copyright act in the United States was
passed by the state of Connecticut in January 1783 and
stated:
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the principles of natu-
338. See BUGBEE, supra note 328, at 120-21 (noting that Madison, a member
of the Virginia House of Delegates, presented the bill and was a member of the
committee which drafted and presented the bill, but noting that action on the
bill was also attributable to Washington's influence).
339. See generally PATTERSON, supra note 155, at 183-92 (discussing states'
copyright provisions).
340. These states were Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Jerse y, New
York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra
note 337, at 1-21 (reprinting respective statutes).
341. See id. at 15-17.
342. See id. at 8.
343. These states were Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Virginia. See id. at
4-5 (discussing Massachusetts); id. at 9-10 (discussing Rhode Island); id. at 14-
15 (discussing Virginia).
344. COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 337, at 6 (reprinting the Maryland
statute that stated "[t]his act to commence and be in force from and after the
time that similar laws shall be passed.., in all and every of the United
States."); id. at 11 (reprinting the Pennsylvania statute that stated "this act
shall not take place until such time as all and every of the States in the Union
shall have passed laws similar to the same ").
345. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discussing Connecticut).
346. For example, Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, and South Carolina required registration with the secretary of state. See
id. at 2, 7, 13, 16, 17, 20. Maryland required registration with the clerk of the
court. Id. at 6. Pennsylvania required registration with the prothonotary. Id.
at 11. Virginia required registration with the clerk of the council. Id. at 15.
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ral equity and justice, that every author should be secured
in receiving the profits that may arise from the sale of his
works, and such security may encourage men of learning
and genius to publish their writings; which may do honour
to their country, and service to mankind. 47
Similarly, the preamble to the North Carolina statute ac-
knowledged both interests as follows:
Whereas nothing is more strictly a man's own than the
fruit of his study, and it is proper that men should be en-
couraged to pursue useful knowledge by the hope of re-
ward; and as the security of literary property must greatly
tend to encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries,
and to the general extension of arts and commerce:
1. Be it enacted.... 34
In short, these laws acknowledged that authors had the right
to benefit from their creations (the property rationale), but
also recognized that protecting this right would advance the
public good by encouraging creation of works (the public bene-
fit rationale).
As with so many issues under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the problem with implementing copyright protection on
the state level was the resulting lack of uniformity between
the various state laws with the attendant risks of eviscerating
the value of the copyrights. James Madison wrote in The
347. Id. at 1. The New York and Georgia statutes followed closely the Con-
necticut statute and contain very similar language. See id. at 17 (discussing
Georgia.); id. at 19 (discussing New York).
348. Id. at 15. The preamble to the Massachusetts statute used substantially
different language but acknowledged the same interests.
Whereas the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization,
the public weal of the community, and the advancement of human hap-
piness, greatly depend on the efforts of learned and ingenious persons
in the various arts and sciences: As the principal encouragement such
persons can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature,
must exist in the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry
to themselves; and as such security is one of the natural rights of all
men, there being no property more peculiarly a man's own than that
which is produced by the labour of his mind.
Therefore, to encourage learned and ingenious persons to write useful
books for the benefit of mankind:
Be it enacted....
Id. at 4; accord id. at 8 (discussing New Hampshire); id. at 9 (discussing Rhode
Island). For statutes using different language but to the same effect, see id. at 5
(discussing Maryland); id. at 6 (discussing New Jersey); id. at 10 (discussing
Pennsylvania).
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Federalist No. 43 that the Copyright Clause was necessary
because the "states cannot separately make effectual provi-
sion" for copyright protection.349 In the words of Justice Story:
It was beneficial to all parties, that the national govern-
ment should possess this power; to authors.., because,
otherwise, they would be subjected to the varying laws
and systems of the different states on this subject, which
would impair, and might even destroy the value of their
rights .... 350
2. The Copyright Clause-To Promote the Progress of
Science
Against the backdrop of the state copyright laws and con-
cern for the need of uniform laws, the framers in 1787 in-
cluded in the Constitution Article I, section 8, which states in
relevant part that "[t]he Congress shall have Power... To
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ""' This
language was unanimously approved without debate at the
Constitutional Convention.
Relatively little is known about the details of how the
particular language was drafted or came to be included in the
349. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, 222 (James Madison) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001). The need for uniformity was recognized by the
framers, id., and states in the process of ratifying the Constitution. See 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 415
(Merrill Jensen, ed. 1976) (stating that the copyright power "could only with ef-
fect be exercised by the Congress") (quoting Thomas McKean in debates of the
Pennsylvania Convention, Nov. 28, 1787); 3 id. at 525 (citing Roger Sherman, A
Citizen of New Haven, CONN. COURANT, Jan. 7, 1788) (stating that the Copy-
right Clause among others "appears to be necessary for the common benefit of
the states and could not be effectually provided for by the particular states"). In
the debates over ratification before the Pennsylvania Convention, Thomas
McKean explained the problem:
For, sir, the laws of the respective [s]tates could only operate within
their respective boundaries, and therefore, a work which had cost the
author his whole life to complete, when published in one state, however
it might there be secured, could easily be carried into another state in
which a republication would be accompanied with neither penalty nor
punishment-a circumstance manifestly injurious to the author in par-
ticular, and to the cause of science in general.
2 id. at 415.
350. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 402, § 1147 (Colorado, Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
351. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Constitution, but there is no doubt that James Madison
played an important-if not the most important-role in its
drafting and inclusion.352 By the time of the framing of the
Constitution, Madison was no stranger to copyright law.
Noah Webster first met Madison in 1782 and suggested the
idea of copyright legislation.353 At that meeting, Webster pre-
sented his manuscript of A Grammatical Institute of the Eng-
lish Language to Madison for his review, and Madison ap-
proved of the idea for copyright legislation.35 '  In 1783,
Madison, as a member of Congress, was part of the three-
member committee whose report brought the resolution call-
ing for state copyright protection.355 Shortly thereafter, in
1785, Madison actively participated in drafting and passing
copyright legislation in the Virginia Legislature. "'
352. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina may deserve particular credit for
first suggesting the power to issue patents. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE
NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 103 (2002) (concluding that Pinckney may have been the first to
propose patent power); see also id. at 82 (suggesting substantial credit goes to
Pinckney for the intellectual property clause). Others have been more skeptical
of his role. See Fenning, supra note 3, at 109-13 (stating that contrary to some
suggestions, the clause was not originally included in Pinckney's South Carolina
plan and arguing that Madison is entitled to as much credit as Pinckney).
According to Walterscheid, Madison's role was more "in the context of protecting
the rights of authors rather than those of inventors." WALTERSCHEID, supra, at
103. Bugbee concludes that both Madison and Pinckney must be given credit
for inclusion of copyright authority. BUGBEE, supra note 328, at 127.
353. WARFEL, supra note 328, at 55.
354. Id.
355. COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 337, at 1; CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS JOURNALS, supra note 336, at 326; IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON:
THE NATIONALIST 1780-1787 370-71 (1948) (noting that Madison helped draft
the resolution). The CONTINENTAL CONGRESS JOURNALS states:
The committee, consisting of Mr. [Hugh] Williamson, Mr. [Ralph]
Izard and Mr. [James] Madison, to whom were referred sundry papers
and memorials from different persons on the subject of literary prop-
erty, being persuaded that nothing is more properly a man's own than
the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security of literary
property would greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote useful dis-
coveries and to the general extension of arts and commerce, beg leave
to submit the following report ....
Supra note 336, at 326.
356. See WARFEL, supra note 328, at 58, 132 (noting Madison's acquaintance
with Webster and Madison's assistance in obtaining copyright legislation in
Virginia); LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER 8-9 (Harry R. Warfel ed., 1953) (noting a
letter from Webster to Madison dated July 5, 1784, asking him to introduce
copyright legislation in the Virginia Assembly); id. at 39 (noting a letter from
Webster to Washington, dated Dec. 16, 1785, discussing Webster's trip to Rich-
mond and his success in obtaining copyright legislation in Virginia).
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In April 1787, just prior to the Constitutional Conven-
tion, Madison commented on the weaknesses of the Confed-
eration and noted, among other things, "the want of uniform-
ity in the laws concerning naturalization and literary
property."35 7 The Constitutional Convention first met to begin
its work on May 14, 1787.358 During the course of the Consti-
tutional Convention, Webster and Madison met socially. 59
On August 18, 1787, James Madison proposed that the Con-
stitution grant the legislature power "[t]o secure to literary
authors their copyrights for a limited time."360 On the same
day, Charles Pinckney also proposed to include the power
"[o secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time."61
These proposals were initially referred to the Committee of
Detail. Later, on August 31, 1787, the Committee of Eleven,
which included Madison, was appointed to consider conven-
tion items postponed or not yet acted on.362 The Committee of
Eleven, on September 5, 1787, reported the language of the
Copyright Clause now included in the Constitution, and the
language was agreed to unanimously.363  The Copyright
Clause does enjoy some similarity with the Continental Con-
gress's resolution and the Virginia copyright act, both of
which Madison participated in drafting.3" The resolution en-
couraged states "to secure to the authors ... the copy
357. Fenning, supra note 3, at 113 (quoting 4 STATE DEP'T, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 128 (1894-
1900)); see PRANT, supra note 355, at 411-12 (noting need for federal power over
copyrights); BUGBEE, supra note 328, at 125.
358. 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at xi (1911). The delegates first met on May 14, 1787, but it was not until May
25, 1787, that sufficient delegates had gathered to actually organize the conven-
tion and remain in session.
359. See HARLOW GILES UNGER, NOAH WEBSTER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN
AMERICAN PATRIOT 130 (1998) (noting frequent visits and dinners with mem-
bers of the convention including Madison); WARFEL, supra note 328, at 165 (not-
ing that Webster had met or dined with numerous members of the Convention
including Madison).
360. 2 FARRAND, supra note 358, at 325.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 481.
363. See id. at 505, 508-09. According to Madison's notes the clause was
agreed to "nem. con:." Id. at 509 (abbreviating the Latin phrase nemine contra-
dicente, meaning "with no one contradicting"); 10 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 313 (1989).
364. See BUGBEE, supra note 328, at 126-27 (noting the similarity between
the Virginia copyright act and the Continential Congress resolution).
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right.., for a certain time .... The Virginia legislation
was entitled "An Act securing to the authors of literary works
an exclusive property therein for a limited time.""'
B. The Public Benefit Rationale for Copyright Protection and
the Rejection of Perpetual Common Law Copyright
1. Language and Intent of the Copyright Clause
The Constitution adopted the utilitarian, public benefit
rationale for copyright protection over the property right ra-
tionale. Some have argued that the use of the word "secur-
ing" in the Copyright Clause suggests recognition and confir-
mation of a preexisting common law right. 6 ' This argument
was posed to, and rejected by, the Supreme Court in 1834 in
Wheaton v. Peters.3" The Court noted that the word referred
to inventors as well as authors, and undisputedly inventors
had no common law claim."9 "Securing" in the eighteenth
century had multiple meanings, irfcluding not only to assure
or make certain but also to obtain or provide.37 °
Although there is sparse extrinsic evidence concerning
the framers' understanding of the Copyright Clause or their
intent in including the clause, Madison did reveal his under-
standing of the Copyright Clause. In The Federalist No. 43,371
published on January 23, 1788, Madison wrote:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copy-right of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great
Britain, to be a right at common law. The right to useful
inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the in-
365. COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 337, at 1.
366. Id. at 14 (capitalization standardized).
367. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 600-01 (1834) (arguing that "it
seems too plain, to admit of argument, that when the constitution authorizes
congress to secure an acknowledged pre-existing right, and does not authorize
them to grant it; it is an express declaration, that it subsists, and is to subsist,
independently of their power").
368. Id. at 660-61.
369. Id. at 661.
370. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 352, at 212-26 (providing a thorough
and thoughtful discussion of the meaning of "securing" in the Copyright
Clause). For further discussion of the word "secure" as confirming an existing
right, see Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 681, 691 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing "secure" in the 1783 resolution calling for state copyright legislation and
in the 1790 Act).
371. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 349, at 222.
2004 423
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
ventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with
the claims of individuals.
Madison's reference to the common law right accepted in
Great Britain is confusing because in fact, as noted earlier,
the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Becket?7 3 in 1774 rejected
perpetual common law copyright.3 74 Madison may have been
referring to the earlier (overruled) decision in Millar v. Tay-
o, 76 or may have reflected a misunderstanding of the holding
of Donaldson, possibly arising from the advisory judicial deci-
sions offered in the case.3 71 Perhaps Madison was referring to
the common law right of first publication.77 In any event,
Madison recognized the "utility" of this provision and the
harmony of the "public good" with "the claims of individu-
als. 378 Madison's other writings clarify that he did not believe
in perpetual common law copyrights rooted in the natural law
rights of authors. In a letter, dated October 17, 1788, Madi-
son responded to Thomas Jefferson's objection3 79 to even the
limited monopoly of copyright:
With regard to Monopolies they are justly classed among
the greatest nusances [sic] in Government. But is it clear
that as encouragements to literary works and ingenious
discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly re-
nounced? Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a
right to the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be
372. Id.
373. 1 Eng. Rep. 847, 847 (H.L. 1774).
374. See supra notes 316-320 and accompanying text (discussing holding of
Donaldson); see also Abrams, supra note 208, at 1161 (noting House of Lords'
total rejection of common law copyright).
375. 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 201 (K.B. 1769).
376. See Abrams, supra note 208, at 1177 (discussing THE FEDERALIST No.
43).
377. Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Oigins of the Patent
and Copyright Clause, 49 J. OF COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 675, 690 (2002). Madison
viewed an author's unpublished work as the author's own private property. See
supra notes 371-72 and accompanying text (quoting Madison on the need for
limited monopoly as payment to authors for release of their property to the pub-
lic).
378. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 349, at 222.
379. 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 545 (James Morton Smith ed.,
1995). Jefferson, in a letter dated July 31, 1788, objected to a limited copyright
monopoly: "The saying there shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements to
ingenuity, which is spurred on by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as
of 14 years; but the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be op-
posed to that of their general suppression." Id.
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specified in the grant of it?38 °
Madison reluctantly supported the limited monopoly of copy-
right in order to encourage the creation of literary works.
Copyright was a "grant" and a "privilege" bestowed by the
government. The words "grant" and "privilege" support a
positive law theory of copyright and are inconsistent with an
inherent property right theory.3"'
Madison on another occasion characterized copyright as a
"grant" when he warned that monopolies "ought to be granted
with caution" and stated:
The Constitution of the United States has limited [mo-
nopolies] to two cases-the authors of Books, and of useful
inventions, in both [of] which they are considered as com-
pensation for a benefit actually gained to the community
as a purchase of property which the owners might other-
wise withhold from public use. There can be no just objec-
tion to temporary monopolies in these cases; but it ought
to be temporary because under that limitation a sufficient
recompense and encouragement may be given.382
Madison consistently viewed copyright as a grant of a limited
monopoly, which served an important public purpose. This
limited monopoly was acceptable because it was for a limited
time and not perpetual.383 This passage also reveals Madi-
son's recognition that authors had property rights in their
works prior to the publication of those works; the monopoly
was a purchase of the author's property to encourage its re-
lease to the public. Thomas Jefferson38 in his correspondence
380. Id. at 566.
381. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 377, at 692 (arguing that use of "privi-
lege" and "grant" indicate rights bestowed by government not confirmation of
existing rights).
382. JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 756 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (characteriz-
ing "detached memoranda," possibly dating back to 1819, and entitled "Monopo-
lies. Perpetuities. Corporations. Ecclesiastical Endowments."); see also As-
pects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago, 128 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 489, 490
(1914) (publishing for the first time Madison's essay entitled "Monopolies, Per-
petuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments").
383. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 352, at 226 (stating that "[plerpetual
monopolies of every sort are forbidden").
384. Jefferson was not a framer of the Constitution. He was the United
States Minister to France at the time and was not available to participate in the
Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., Lance Banning, The Constitutional Con-
vention, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUION 112 (Leonard
W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987) (noting that Jefferson, who was repe-
senting the United States abroad, was not part of the Convention); MAX
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with Madison unambiguously expressed his dim view of even
limited duration copyrights, which he viewed as monopolies.385
Noah Webster, on the other hand, supported perpetual
copyright and adhered to the private property rationale for
copyright protection.386 Yet he too understood that there was
no recognized perpetual common law copyright in America.
In 1783, Webster, in advocating for copyright legislation, ac-
knowledged that no protection existed for copyright interests
in the United States. In his request to the legislature of New
York, he wrote that copyright legislation was needed "to se-
cure to your petitioner the benefits of his own labors to which
he conceives himself solely entitled but which are not pro-
tected by the laws that protect every other species of prop-
erty."38 ' Webster understood that he could not rely upon a
theory of common law copyright protection for his work.
Later, in 1803, Webster argued that the interest in origi-
nal literary works should be no different than all other per-
sonal property."' He disagreed with the holding of Donaldson
v. Beckett, but he understood that his own view was not gen-
BELOFF, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 101 (1949) (noting
that Jefferson was the American Minister to France from 1785-1789).
385. See 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra note 379, at 545 (reprint of let-
ter from Washington to Madison, dated July 31, 1788, arguing that benefit of
limited copyright monopoly was doubtful). In a letter to Madison concerning
the proposed Bill of Rights he argued that it should include language that "Mo-
nopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature and
their own inventions in the arts for a term not exceeding - years but for no
longer term and no other purpose." Id. at 630 (reprinting letter from Jefferson
to Madison, dated Aug. 28, 1789); see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 352, at 9
(arguing that "Jefferson didn't like the [intellectual property] clause at all").
386. See infra note 388.
387. LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER 7 (Harry R. Warfel ed., 1953) (Webster's
"Memorial to the Legislature of New York" dated Jan. 18, 1783). Webster's
friend, Joel Barlow, also understood that statutory protection was necessary to
protect copyrights. He stated that failure to protect authors was "one of the
evils of society, which requires to be removed by positive statutes securing the
copy-rights of authors, and in that way protecting a species of property which is
otherwise open to every invader." NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 4 PAPERS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 No. 78, folio 369 (1971).
388. See LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER, supra note 387, at 254 (Webster's let-
ter to Simeon Baldwin, Dec. 1803); id. at 383-86 (citing Webster's letter to John
Pickering, Dec. 1816, arguing that literary property should be on equal footing
with other property and criticizing Donaldson); id. at 417-20 (discussing Web-
ster's letter to Daniel Webster, Sept. 30, 1826, criticizing Donaldson and calling
for legislation "in placing this species of property on the same footing as all
other property as to exclusive right and permanence of possession").
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erally accepted.389 He wrote: "Men are strangely influenced by
habits of thinking, and it is a common opinion that literary
composition... should be held only for a limited time, while a
horse or an acre of land ... is permanent inheritable es-
tate."39 Webster understood that the "limited times" lan-
guage of the Copyright Clause was inconsistent with a natu-
ral right property theory of copyright protection. Again in an
1826 letter, he reluctantly admitted that since Donaldson "it
seems to have been generally admitted that an author has not
a permanent and exclusive right to the publication of his
original works at common law."39 '
The legal authorities of the early nineteenth century also
recognized the public benefit purpose behind copyright law.
Legal scholar and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story per-
ceived the public benefit of copyright protection as both the
inducement to prepare works and the public benefit of "full
possession and enjoyment," "without restraint," after the ex-
piration of the copyright. 92 Story did, however, accept the
view that copyright had a common law origin.393
2. The Copyright Act of 1790
The first Congress enacted America's first national copy-
right act in 1790."'4 The Act, like the Copyright Clause and
the Statute of Anne before it, emphasized the public benefit
rationale for copyright protection. The Act was entitled: "An
Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies
of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of
such copies, during the times therein mentioned."395 If the
property right rationale were controlling, a different title
would have been expected. For example, titles such as "An
389. Id. at 254.
390. Id. (emphasis added).
391. Id. at 418 (noting Noah Webster's letter to Daniel Webster, dated Sept.
30, 1826).
392. STORY, supra note 350, at 402, § 558.
393. Id. (noting that "[t]he copyright of authors in their works had, before the
revolution, been decided in Great Britain to be a common law right"); see also 2
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 306-07 (N.Y., 1826) (noting
"[ilt was for some time the prevailing and better opinion in England, that au-
thors had an exclusive copyright at common law, as permanent as the property
of an estate").
394. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). The bill was intro-
duced June 23, 1789 and passed May 31, 1790.
395. Id.
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Act for the protection of authors and proprietors of copies, to
secure to them their property in maps, charts, and books" or
"An Act for securing property of authors and proprietors of
copies in their maps, charts, and books" would be more con-
sistent with a property right rationale. But protecting prop-
erty rights of authors and their successors was not Congress's
primary objective.
The Copyright Act of 1790 does assume the existence of
copyrights prior to the Act. It granted protection to an author
who had "not transferred to any other person the copyright"
of a map, chart, or book, and to others who had "purchased or
legally acquired the copyright of any such map, chart, book or
books." '396 This language, as Walterscheid points out, "sug-
gests a perception by Congress that it was not creating a
right but rather affirming and protecting an existing right."397
In Wheaton v. Peters, counsel made this argument to the Su-
preme Court:
The import of the act of congress of 1790 is, that before its
enactment, there were legal rights of authorship existing;
it provides for existing property, not for property created
by the statute. There is nothing for its provision to stand
upon, but the common law. The law is not one of grant or
bounty; it recognizes existing rights, which it secures."'
The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that the
reference to subsisting copyrights referred to the common law
property right in the manuscript. 399 The Court further con-
cluded that Congress, by providing that authors "shall have
the sole right and liberty of printing," was clearly not recog-
nizing an existing right. "Could [Congress] have deemed it
necessary to vest a right already vested. Such a presumption
is refuted by the words [used] .... 0 These subsisting copy-
396. Id.
397. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 352, at 219.
398. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 653 (1834).
399. Id. at 661. In rejecting the argument, the Court remarked:
As before stated, an author has, by the common law, a property in his
manuscript; and there can be no doubt that the rights of an assignee of
such manuscript, would be protected by a court of chancery. This is
presumed to be the copyright recognized in the act, and which was in-
tended to be protected by its provisions. And this protection was given,






rights may have been the common law right of first publica-
tion as suggested by the Court in Wheaton, or it may have re-
ferred to copyrights granted under state copyright statutes.4 °'
Admittedly, it may have referred to perceived common law
copyrights.4"2
3. Supreme Court Recognition of the Public Benelit
Rationale of Copyright
From early on, the Supreme Court has recognized the
public benefit rationale for copyright protection and has re-
jected a natural law property right rationale and its close
relative, perpetual post-publication common law copyright.
The landmark copyright case Wheaton v. Peters°3 laid the
groundwork. Wheaton involved a dispute over, of all things,
twelve volumes of reported United States Supreme Court
cases ("Wheaton's Reports").4 " Henry Wheaton, a Supreme
Court reporter, and his copyright successor complained that
Richard Peters infringed the plaintiffs' copyright by copying
decisions from Wheaton's Reports and including them in his
volume "Condensed Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of
the United States." ''0 Defendants in the case argued that the
plaintiffs had no valid copyright because the plaintiffs had
not complied with the requirements of the copyright statute,
and the lower court dismissed the complaint.4 '
Counsel for Wheaton argued that a common law perpet-
ual copyright existed concurrently with statutory copyright.4 7
The Court confirmed that an author has at common law a
property interest in an unpublished manuscript, but found
that the existence of common law post-publication perpetual
copyright in England was "by no means free from doubt.4 8
At a minimum, the Court found that no common law copy-
right existed in England when Pennsylvania became a colony
and doubted that such a concept could have been incorporated
401. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aftd sub nom.,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
402. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 352, at 219-20.
403. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 591.
404. Id. at 618-19.
405. Id. at 593-95.
406. Id. at 595.
407. Id. at 595-98.
408. Id. at 657.
2004 429
430 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW Vol: 44
into the laws of Pennsylvania.4 °9 In rejecting common law
copyright, the Court concluded that "Congress, then, by [the
1790 Act], instead of sanctioning an existing right ... created
it. '41° The Court held that the plaintiffs' claim, if any, had to
be brought under statutory copyright.41 ' Over a century later,
the Court in Mazer v. Stein12 reaffirmed the holding of Whea-
ton when it held Congress's statutes create copyright. "It did
not exist at common law even though he had a property right
in his unpublished work." 3
In a long line of cases the Supreme Court has recognized
that under the Constitution, the primary objective of copy-
right protection is not to reward authors but to benefit the
public by encouraging the production of works.414 Lower
409. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 660.
410. Id. at 661; see also id. at 663 ("This right.., does not exist at common
law-it originated, if at all, under the acts of congress."). The dissenters in
Wheaton vigorously disagreed. See id. at 668-98.
411. Id. at 662; Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884) (recognizing the holding of Donaldson, that copyright is controlled by
statute); cf Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 85 (1899) (concluding that rights in
copyright are determined by the acts of Congress, although rights did exist at
common law).
412. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
413. Id. at 214-15; see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Emil Werckmeister, 207 U.S.
284, 291 (1907) (citing Wheaton for the proposition that copyright is the crea-
tion of federal statute).
414. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349-50 (1991) (stating that the primary objective of copyright protection was not
to reward authors); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524, 526 (1994) ("The
primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original
literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public."); N.Y. Times
v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 496 n.3 (2001) (noting under Copyright Clause encour-
agement of individual effort is the best way to advance public welfare); Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) stating:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like
the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, mu-
sic, and other arts.
Id.; see also Mazer, 374 U.S. at 219 (stating that reward to owners is secondary;
"[tihe economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare"); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law...
makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."); Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors."); ct Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
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courts, particularly the influential Second Circuit,415 have fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's lead.416 In the words of Justice
Stevens in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a spe-
cial private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means
by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It
is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to al-
low the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.417
The Court acknowledged that the grant of copyright protec-
tion to authors is a means to achieve "an important public
purpose."4 8
The Court's latest pronouncements in Eldred v. Ashcroft
continue to acknowledge the utilitarian public benefit ration-
ale for copyright protection; "[tihe 'constitutional command,'
we have recognized, is that Congress, to the extent it enacts
copyright laws at all, create[s] a 'system' that 'promote[s] the
Progress of Science.' 419  In Eldred, however, the Court did
step back from its prior statements. In a curious footnote, the
Court criticized Justice Stevens' citation in his dissent of the
Court's own prior cases: "Justice Stevens' characterization of
reward to the author as 'a secondary consideration' of copy-
right law, understates the relationship between such rewards
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (stating that the goal of copyright is "to promote sci-
ence and the arts").
415. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,
J., recognizing the Second Circuit as "the nation's premier copyright court"); Leo
J. Raskind, Accessing the Impact ofFeist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 338 (1992)
(recognizing that the Second Circuit historically has dominated developments in
copyright law).
416. See, e.g., Computer Assocs., Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir.
1992) ("The interest of copyright law is not in simply conferring a monopoly on
industrious persons, but in advancing the public welfare .. "); Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that "the
fundamental policy undergirding the copyright laws" is "the encouragement of
contributions to recorded knowledge"); Berlin v. E.C. Publ's, Inc., 329 F.2d 541,
543-44 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating "financial reward guaranteed to the copyright
holder is but an incident of this general objective, rather than an end in itself").
417. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
418. Id. at 429; accord Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (quoting Sony).
419. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Graham v. John
Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
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and the 'Progress of Science.' 4 ° The Court specifically cites
footnote four of Justice Stevens' dissent, a footnote which con-
sists entirely of a quotation to the Court's own opinion in
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc .421 Only twelve
years earlier in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.,42 the Court confirmed that "[t]he primary objec-
tive of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'423  Both
Paramount Pictures and Mazer v. Stein had unambiguously
held that "It]he copyright law... makes reward to the owner
a secondary consideration." Justice Stevens can hardly be
faulted for relying on the Court's precedent.
In the same footnote, the Court criticized Justice Breyer's
dissenting view "that 'copyright statutes must serve public,
not private, ends.' 45 That "assertion," according to the Court
"misses the mark," because "[t]he two ends are not mutually
exclusive."4 26 Whether or not Justice Breyer missed the mark,
he did correctly state what had theretofore been the law
based on the Copyright Clause, the Court's prior cases, and
other authorities.4 27  Even in light of the Court's unhappy
footnote, the Court did continue to recognize the public bene-
fit rationale for copyright protection that has consistently
been a beacon for its prior cases.2 8
4. Congressional Recognition of the Public Benefit
Purpose of Copyright
The Court's view of the purpose of copyright is in har-
mony with what has historically been Congress's understand-
420. Id. at 212 n.18.
421. Id.; id. at 227 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
422. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
423. Id. at 349.
424. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) (quoting Paramount Pictures).
425. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18; id. at 247 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing).
426. Id. at 212 n.18.
427. See id. (citing not only the Court's prior cases but also the House Re-
ports on the 1909 Copyright Act and the 1988 amendments to the 1976 Copy-
right Act and the views of James Madison in support of his position).
428. Id. at 212 (referencing the public purpose basis of copyright with refer-
ences to the "Progress of Science," "public benefit," "public good," and "public
ends").
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ing of copyright.429 In a House committee report from 1830,
the Committee on the Judiciary urged for copyright legisla-
tion lengthening the term of copyright protection. The report
argued that "the United States ought to be foremost among
nations in encouraging science and literature, by securing the
fruits of intellectual labor," but concluded that the United
States was far behind Europe. 4 ° The committee appreciated
the connection between strong copyright protection and the
production of works; it urged that "[w]e ought to present
every reasonable inducement to influence men to consecrate
their talents to the advancement of science."43' The report
also reflected the influence of the property right rationale for
copyright.411 In a confusing run-on sentence, the report stated
as fact that "[in England, the right of an author to the exclu-
sive and perpetual profits of his book was enjoyed, and never
questioned, until it was decided by Parliament... that the
statute of Anne had abridged the common law right, which it
conceded, had existed ....
As noted earlier, whatever may have been Congress's im-
pression in 1830, there had been substantial doubt about the
429. It may be unfair to ascribe any single view of copyright to Congress, a
large collective body divided into two discrete houses, with hundreds of individ-
ual members, and whose membership changes on a regular basis. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) ("Because legis-
latures comprise many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs,' hidden
yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body as a
whole, however, has only outcomes."). Nevertheless, attempting to divine con-
gressional intent is basic to judicial review of federal statutes. See, e.g., Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
("If a court... ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise ques-
tion at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.") Consideration
of committee reports, statements of individual members, and legislative results
can provide some sense of what many, if not most, members of Congress did un-
derstand concerning the basis of copyright law. See, e.g., Thornbury v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986) ("We have repeatedly recognized that the authorita-
tive source for legislative intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill.").
430. H.R. REP. NO. 3, at 2 (1830), reprinted in U.S. CONG. SERIAL SET 210
(1830).
431. Id.; see also 7 REG. DEB. 423 (1831) (statement by Rep. Ellsworth that
bill would "enhance the literary character of the country" by providing addi-
tional inducements to men of learning and genius).
432. See Ochoa, supra note 3, at 31 (noting and documenting the view that
members of Congress in 1831 believed copyright was a natural right).
433. H.R. REP. No. 3, supra note 430, at 1-2; see also 7 REG. DEB. 423, supra
note 431 (statement by Rep. Verplanck that "a right of property existing before
the law of copyrights had been made" and arguing that authors enjoy a natural
right to their works regardless of the statute).
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existence of post-publication common law copyright, and fur-
thermore, the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett in fact
did not concede its pre-Statute of Anne existence.434 The re-
port also specifically cited the 1769 ruling in Millar v. Taylor
and confused it with the later ruling in Donaldson.35  Fur-
thermore the report leaned to the natural law property view
of copyright when it stated that "[u]pon the first principles of
proprietorship in property, an author has an exclusive and
perpetual right, in preference to any other, to the fruits of his
labor. '4 6 The report did not call for recognition of perpetual
copyright but instead only advocated that an initial term of
twenty-eight years followed by a renewal term of fourteen
years was "not too liberal."4 7
Later, Congress acknowledged the holding of Wheaton
and rejected the natural law property theory of copyright.
Both the House and Senate reports for the 1909 Copyright
Act provided greater clarity when they stated that copyright
under the Constitution "is not based upon any natural right
that the author has in his writings.., but upon the ground
that the welfare of the public will be served."438 The commit-
tees took this position notwithstanding visible advocates of
the natural law property view and testimony to the commit-
tee supporting the natural law property position.439 Signifi-
cantly, the Senate Committee on Patents apparently experi-
434. See supra notes 309-20 and accompanying text (discussing common law
copyright and Donaldson).
435. H.R. REP. No. 3, supra note 430, at 1-2. The full sentence in the report
is:
In England, the right of an author to the exclusive and perpetual prof-
its of his book was enjoyed, and never questioned, until it was decided
in Parliament, by a small vote, in the case of Miller [sic] vs. Taylor, in
the year 1769, and contrary to a decision of the same case in the King's
Bench, that the statute of Ann [sic] had abridged the common law
right, which, it was conceded, had existed, instead of merely guarding
and securing it by forfeitures for a limited time, as was obviously in-
tended.
Id.
436. Id, at 2.
437. Id.
438. H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 7 (1909); S. REP. No. 1108, at 7 (1909) (incorpo-
rating and quoting the House report); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985) (Brennen, J., dissenting) (quoting the House
Report for the 1909 Copyright Act).
439. See Ochoa, supra note 3, at 33 n.76 (noting the position of the American
Copyright League that copyright was a natural right); id. at 36 (noting testi-
mony of Edward Everett Hale that copyright was a natural right of the author).
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enced a quick conversion. A scarce two years earlier in 1907,
the same Senate Committee on Patents concluded that the
common law of England recognized that an author "should be
entitled to the exclusive right to reproduce and sell for his
own profit copies of his literary works," and continued that
music was entitled to the same protection afforded literary
works.4 ° Music, literary, and artistic productions "were all
intellectual works of an author, things born from the creative
powers of the mind, nonexistent before, and natural property
by virtue of their creation., 4 1 Yet even in this report, in the
very next sentence, the committee acknowledged that under
the Constitution Congress was empowered to grant copy-
rights to encourage science and the useful arts.442
In a 1909 floor debate, Representative Currier, Chairman
of the House Committee on Patents, stated that "there is no
property right in writings" and confirmed that "[t]he courts
have held again and again that the composer or the inventor
has no natural rights in his writings or discoveries, but such
rights as he has are purely statutory rights."4 3 The House
and Senate reports further stated the respective committees'
understanding that Congress's power to legislate in the area
of copyright was limited by the Copyright Clause.
[T]he spirit of any act which Congress is authorized to
pass must be one which will promote the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts, and unless it is designed to ac-
complish this result and is believed, in fact, to accomplish
this result, it would be beyond the power of Congress. 4
At least for the Congress of 1909, the public benefit rationale
was controlling.
Moving forward to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act,
the House Report continued to recognize the public benefit ra-
tionale for copyright and the need for limited term copyrights.
The report observed that since the first United States Copy-
right Act in 1790, unpublished works had been governed by
-"common law copyright" and published works had been gov-
440. S. REP. No. 6187, at 2-3 (1907).
441. Id.
442. Id. at 3.
443. 43 CONG. REC. 3765 (1909); see also id. at 3766 (noting that copyright is
the creation of a new right and may accordingly be limited); id. at 3768 (stating
that "there is no property right existing in any production... except the right
that is prescribed by law under the provisions of the Constitution").
444. H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 7 (1909); S. REP. No. 1108, at 7 (1909).
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erned by statutory copyrights. 445  The report argued that
adoption of the legislation would "implement the 'limited
times' provision of the Constitution" by doing away with per-
petual common law copyrights in unpublished works."6
Moreover, it confirmed that "limitations on the term of copy-
right are obviously necessary," but "too short a term harms
the author without giving any substantial benefit to the pub-
lic.
4 47
Comments from two Senators important to the passage of
the 1976 Copyright Act confirm recognition of the public pol-
icy basis for copyright protection. Senator McClellan, chair-
man of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights, and who worked on the legisla-
tion for over a decade," 8 spoke in favor of the 1976 Act and
stated:
The Constitution makes clear that the purpose of protect-
ing the rights of an author is to promote the public inter-
est. But, as stated in the committee report on the Act of
1909-The granting of such exclusive rights.., confers a
benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the
temporary monopoly.
449
He further stated that "[t]he Judiciary Committee has tried to
resolve each issue by applying the standard of what best
promotes the constitutional mandate to encourage and re-
ward authorship.WO He also reiterated his words from 1965,
when he first began work on a new copyright act, "that [his]
sole objective 'was to devise a modern copyright statute that
would encourage creativity and protect the interests which
the public has."'4 1 Senator Tunney also noted the "constitu-
tional mandate to promote the progress of science and useful
arts. 452
445. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129-30 (1976), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5745 (1976).
446. Id. at 130.
447. Id. at 134.
448. See 122 CONG. REC. 33813 (1976) (referring to the long journey of the
legislation beginning before McClellan's committee in 1965).
449. Id. at 2834.
450. Id. at 2835.
451. Id. at 33813.
452. Id. at 3144 (capitilization standardized).
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V. CTEA: IGNORING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
In 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act ("CTEA"). 453 The Act amended the Copy-
right Act of 1976 codified in title 17, by extending the dura-
tion of existing and future copyrights by twenty years. The
term of copyright for new works generally went from the life
of the author plus fifty years, to the life of the author plus
seventy years.454 The term of copyrights for works made for
hire was also increased by twenty years, resulting in a term
of the shorter of ninety-five years from publication or 120
45years from creation. 5 Existing copyright terms also were ex-
tended by twenty years.4" The passage of the CTEA came af-
ter three years of consideration and congressional hearings on
the matter.5 7
With the passage of the CTEA, one may doubt whether
the majority of the members of Congress gave serious consid-
eration to the public benefit rationale supporting copyright
protection.4 8 Instead, members' comments and the testimony
453. The short title of the Act is the "Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act." Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 101,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998). The Act is also referred to as the Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act of 1998 or the CTEA.
454. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (life of author plus
seventy years); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
§ 102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
455. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(c); Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
456. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 303-04 (2000) (current codifica-
tion); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102,
112 Stat. 2827-28 (1998).
457. In the Senate, Senators Hatch, Feinstein, and Thompson, introduced the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995, on March 2, 1995. See S. REP. No. 104-
315 (1996). Hearings were held before the Senate and House Committees in
1995 and 1997. The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995. Hearing on S. 483
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter S.
Hearings]; Copyright Term, Flm Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. of the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter H Hearings ] Pre-
1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing Musical Compositions; Copyright
Term Extension; and Copyrght Per Program Licenses: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Comm.,
105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter H Hearings I].
458. The public benefit rationale refers to the traditional utilitarian view and
rejects the broader view that the rationale should extend beyond creating incen-
tives for creation of new works. See S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 16 (stating
that "[m]aintaining and enhancing the health of our copyright industries should
be viewed as being in the public interest"); Shira Perlmutter, Participation in
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presented to Congress revealed a property-rights-driven
agenda and consideration of economic factors unrelated to the
public benefit from the creation of new works and access to
existing works.
A. Arguments for Copyright Extension
Congress and defenders of the CTEA pointed to four
main justifications for the extension. The first and primary
justification was the desire to harmonize United States copy-
right law with European Union copyright law. The second
justification-closely related to the first-was the perceived
favorable impact the extension would have on United States
trade. The third justification was fairness to authors. The
fourth justification was the stimulation of new works and
preservation of existing, historical works. These bases are set
forth in the Senate Report supporting the bill:
The purpose of the bill is to ensure adequate copyright for
American works in foreign nations and the continued eco-
nomic benefits of a healthy surplus balance of trade in the
exploitation of copyrighted works .... [The twenty year]
extension will provide significant trade benefits by sub-
stantially harmonizing U.S. copyright law to that of the
European Union while ensuring fair compensation for
American creators who deserve to benefit fully from the
exploitation of their works.459
As an apparent afterthought, the Senate Report paid the
obligatory homage to the public benefit rationale of copyright
and the enhancement of the public domain; "by stimulating
the creation of new works, and providing enhanced economic
incentives to preserve existing works, such an extension will
enhance the long-term volume, vitality, and accessibility of
the public domain."460 Senator Hatch, the sponsor of the bill
in the Senate, emphasized international trade and fairness to
authors as grounds for the bill.461
In the House, proponents sounded the same themes. Ac-
cording to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2002) (arguing that "progress of
science" should not be limited to creating incentives for new creation).
459. S. REP. No. 104-315, at 3.
460. Id.
461. S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 1-2.
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Courts and Intellectual Property, Rep. Howard Coble, "[t]he
main reasons for this extension of term are fairness and eco-
nomics.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,43 the Supreme Court held that
these justifications provided a rational basis for congressional
enactment of the CTEA.64  In Eldred, the Court considered
whether Congress exceeded the scope of its authority under
the Copyright Clause by extending existing copyrights by
twenty years and whether the Act violated First Amendment
free speech guarantees. The Court held that the Constitution
authorized Congress to extend the life of an existing copyright
and did not violate the limited times requirement of the Con-
stitution. In a show of substantial deference to Congress, the
Court held: "[I]t is generally for Congress, not the courts, to
decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objec-
tives.1465  The Court agreed with extension proponents that
harmonizing United States law with European Union law and
providing greater incentives for authors established a ra-
tional basis for enacting the CTEA.4 6  Notwithstanding the
holding in Eldred, the justifications proffered by Congress
demand careful consideration.
B. Harmonization with EULaw and Trade Considerations
The first and dominating argument of supporters of the
Act was the need to harmonize United States law with Euro-
pean Union law. Senator Feinstein, a cosponsor of the Act,
saw the need for harmonization as "[p]erhaps the most com-
pelling reason" for the legislation.467 Supporters argued that
the United States would risk its leadership role in the area of
copyright law if it failed to match the increased term adopted
by the EU.
4 65
462. H. Hearings II, supra note 457, at 3; accord H Hearings I, supra note
457, at 2 (statement by Rep. Moorhead, subcomm. Chairman: "The main rea-
sons for this extension of term are fairness and economics.").
463. 537 U.S. 186, 186 (2003).
464. It is not the intent of this article to thoroughly explore or analyze the
Eldreddecision or holding.
465. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212.
466. See id.
467. S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 4.
468. See H Hearings II, supra note 457, at 32 (stating that "[w]hile the
United States has always been the standard bearer on copyright throughout the
world, we have let major trading partners get ahead of us in this one area, the
term of copyright"); id. at 46 (stating that "it would be unseemly-it would be
2004 439
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
The underlying assumption of this argument is that
greater copyright protection-in this case a longer term-is
always better, and the United States should have the longest
term possible.469 This assumption ignores the costs of lengthy
copyright protection to the public. The harmonization argu-
ment is also problematic because in some regards the CTEA
actually deharmonized United States law with EU law. The
CTEA extended the term of copyrights for works made for
hire by twenty years. This actually increased the disparity
between the protection afforded in the United States and the
protection afforded in the European Union for comparable
works.47°
The primary rationale for harmonization was economic,
although it also had a fairness aspect. Proponents empha-
sized the trade advantages of extension. Under the "rule of
the shorter term" in the Berne Convention, "the term of copy-
right is... determined by the law of the country where protec-
tion is sought; however, the term of protection need not ex-
ceed that established in the country of origin of the work.,
47
'
Applying this rule, American copyright owners could not
claim the benefits of longer copyright terms allowed under
European laws. Failure to change American law, according to
proponents of the CTEA, would result in loss of payments to
Americans from Europeans, exacerbating America's trade
deficit.472
just plain unthinkable-for the United States to lag behind other nations in
protecting its copyright industries").
469. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S12434 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (stating that
"[t]he United States is the world leader in copyright, and should afford the
greatest protection for copyrighted works of any nation").
470. See H Hearings I, supra note 457, at 49-50 (arguing that extending the
term for works made for hire would deharmonize the U.S. with everyone else);
see also J.H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural
Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625, 633 (1996) (arguing that the exten-
sion of term for works made for hire would "unilaterally worsen the existing
disparities").
471. J. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
July 24, 1971, Art. 7 (8). The Berne Convention is the "premier multilateral
copyright agreement." ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS
§ 12.1 273 (2003). The United States acceded to the Berne Convention in 1989.
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988).
472. Sen. Hatch pointed to the need "to maintain our international trading
position," and argued that "[a]t a time when we face trade deficits in many other
areas, we cannot afford to abandon 20 years' worth of valuable overseas protec-
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These economic motivations drove the adoption of the
CTEA. Proponents of the extension made no secret that eco-
nomics was their foremost consideration. In his testimony
and prepared remarks, Jack Valenti, president and chief ex-
ecutive officer of the Motion Picture Association of America,
emphasized economic interests. The first sentence of his pre-
pared statement is pointed; "[c]opyright term extension has a
simple but compelling enticement: it is very much in Amer-
ica's economic interests.""' In fact, Valenti's statement would
have been more accurate had it stated "it is very much in
copyright owners' economic interests." He does get closer to
the mark when he states later that an extension would "mag-
nify the revenue reach of copyright owners."4 '4 All this "mag-
nification," reportedly would help the United States' "be-
sieged" marketplace ward off the "avalanche of imports" and
respond to a "Europe [that] is girding its economic loins. 475
Copyright extension would help the United States reduce the
trade deficit and strengthen the movie industry. Think about
it. 'Magnify the revenue reach .... " It is a nice way of say-
ing "enrich" existing copyright owners, at the expense of con-
sumers and users of copyrighted works.
Even if short-term economic expediency were the control-
ling factor for copyright law, the harmonization argument ig-
nores the negative consequences to consumers-purchasers
and users-of copyrighted works. The impact of extension
reaches beyond European consumers of American copyrighted
works. American consumers will feel the brunt of the exten-
tion." S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 1-2. Rep. Coble stated that the United
States stood to "lose millions of dollars in export revenues" if extension was not
passed. H Hearings II, supra note 457, at 3.
473. S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 41. Valenti was joined by a host of other
witnesses who emphasized their concern for the trade deficit and American ex-
ports. See id. at 46 (citing the trade deficit and concluding that "[there is no
benefit in virtually giving away 20 extra years to the world at our expense"); id.
at 56 (stating that this is a "trade matter [and] an economic issue of vital impor-
tance"); id. at 57 (statement of Carlos Santana that "I am extremely disturbed
by the negative impact we will sustain in our balance of trade"); id. at 59
(statement of Mrs. Henry Mancini that extension is in the interest of the Ameri-
can economy and balance of trade). Mr. Hoagy Bix Charmichael, President of
AmSong, Inc., in his prepared statement before the House subcommittee
claimed that "the impact on the U.S. balance of trade if copyright term exten-
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sion;476 extension means that for at least twenty more years,
American users will pay more for rights to use those works or
in some cases, will continue to be denied the right to use
them.
The harmonization argument was also based in part on a
fairness argument. In the words of Senator Hatch: "It just
makes plain common sense to ensure fair compensation
for... American creators .... b]y so doing, we guarantee
that our trading partners do not get a free ride for their use of
intellectual property."47" The argument emphasized the un-
fairness of denying American copyright holders the benefit of
European laws. What is unfair about any country applying
the term imposed by American copyright law to American
copyrights?
C. Private Property ofAuthors and 'Fairness"
The fairness argument was not solely tied to the har-
monization with foreign law. Regardless of the actions of the
EU, proponents found "life of the author plus fifty years" to be
too short a time. In support of the CTEA, Senator Hatch
pointed to the authors' justifiable expectations that copy-
rights would be passed to their children and grandchildren,
and he concluded that a term of "life plus fifty years" was too
short.47 Several witnesses decried the unfairness of the term
of "life plus fifty years." ° They argued that American copy-
476. See William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Pro-
tecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 909 (1997) (stating that
"United States and not European consumers will pay the lion's share of royal-
ties generated by term extension").
477. S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 2.
478. See id. at 6 (Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyright, agreeing with
Senator Hatch that "justice and fairness [requires] giving American authors the
same protection afforded their counterparts in Europe."); see also id. at 56 (pre-
pared statement of Bob Dylan, referring to a need of "rectifying the injustice to
American creators"); id. at 57 (prepared statement of Carlos Santana, finding "it
unacceptable that [he] is accorded inferior copyright protection, in the world
marketplace"); id. at 59 (statement of Mrs. Henry Mancini, finding situation
"particularly egregious" that foreign works protected longer).
479. See id. at 2; 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement
by Sen. Hatch that extension needed to address "the insufficiency of the U.S.
copyright term to provide a fair economic return for authors and their depend-
ents").
480. See S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 58 (statement of Mrs. Henry
Mancini finding it "inconceivable that such works would go into the public do-
main at a time when our children will most need the support" and calling for
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right law was intended to protect authors and two genera-
tions of their descendents and that with modern longevity,
"life plus fifty years" fell short of this protection.481
The first problem with the fairness argument is that it is
based on a false premise. Contrary to the suggestion of sev-
eral witnesses,482 American copyright law has never attempted
to ensure copyright protection to benefit the author and two
full generations of the author's descendents. The concept of
ensuring protection for an author's grandchildren is literally
foreign to American copyright law and ironically was im-
ported from the European Union Directive from 1993.43 Sig-
nificantly, continental European copyright law has a different
theoretical basis than American copyright law; continental
European copyright law is premised on the natural law prop-
erty right theory of copyright rather than a utilitarian public
benefit theory.4' The natural law or property right theory
the extension "as a matter of justice for creators and their families"); id. at 60-6 1
(statement of Ellen Donaldson, stating that if her family business "is to survive,
an extension of term is imperative," and noting that loss of copyrights would be
'catastrophic for us"); id. at 64-65 (prepared statement of Shana Alexander find-
ing it "monstrously unfair" that intellectual property cannot be handed down
indefinitely like other forms of property); id. at 65 (prepared statement of E.
Randol Schoenberg arguing that extension would "assist the families who are
the intended beneficiaries of the copyright term" and bemoaning the "great loss"
to his family if his grandfather's works were to pass into the public domain).
481. See id. at 44 (statement by Menken that "[the] intent of our copyright
laws is to encourage creativity by assuring the creator that his or her works will
be protected during the lifetime of the creator and for two generations of his
[sic] or her successors"); id. at 59 (statement by Ellen Donaldson that "Despite
the intent of the 1976 Copyright law and the basic theory of copyright dura-
tion-that protection should exist for the life of the author and two succeeding
generations-the fact is ... [the law] no longer afford[s] that protection, due to
an increase in life expectancy"); id. at 65 (statement by E. Randol Schoenberg,
noting a great loss to grandchildren of Arnold Schoenberg if the law is not
changed); H Hearings II, supra note 457, at 36 (statement of George Weiss,
claiming that Congress previously had extended the copyright term with the
intent to protect three generations); H Hearings I, supra note 457, at 234
(statement of Quincy Jones, claiming that the law is supposed to guarantee the
protection for the creator and two generations).
482. See supra note 481.
483. See Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290/9) whereas clause (5). Pro-
fessor Karjala unambiguously made this point in his prepared statement to the
House Subcommittee on the companion bill. The statement was signed by doz-
ens of copyright professors and also submitted to the Senate Subcommittee. See
S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 86. In her prepared statement, Marybeth Pe-
ters, the Register of Copyright, also acknowledged that United States law had
previously focused on protection of the author and one generation. Id. at 17.
484. See, e.g., Alexander A. Caviedes, International Copyright Law: Should
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supports a different balancing of interests than does the pub-
lic benefit theory and supports very long-even perpetual-
copyright terms.485
A second problem is that life expectancy increased less
than four years from 1976, when Congress had last extended
copyright terms, to 1998, when the CTEA took effect.4 6  A
four-year increase hardly justified a twenty-year extension.487
Longer life expectancies under a copyright term defined by
the author's life automatically extend the actual duration of
copyrights. For each year longer the author lives, the copy-
right's term is extended;41 longer life expectancies are auto-
matically accounted for under American copyright law. The
extended term of the copyright resulting from greater longev-
ity denies the public for a longer period the unrestricted use
the European Union Dictate Its Development, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 165, 169 (1998)
(stating that the natural law theory "took root on the European continent");
Karl Ruping, Copyright and an Integrated European Market.- Conflicts with
Free Movement of Goods, Competition Law, and National Discrimination, 11
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 9 (1997) (noting "fundamental disagreement be-
tween common law and civil law traditions" as they relate to copyright, and not-
ing that civil law tradition embraces a natural law concept); Shauna C. Bryce,
Life Plus Seventy The Extension of Copyrght Terms in the European Union
and Proposed Legislation in the United States, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 525, 525
(1996) (noting that the EU's adoption of life plus seventy reflected effort to
choose a term "that best matched the natural rights philosophy behind Euro-
pean copyright laws").
485. See Reichman, supra note 470, at 643 (noting that the natural property
right rationale argues for perpetual protection of copyrights).
486. In 1976, when Congress implemented a term of the life of the author
plus fifty years, the life expectancy in the United States was approximately 72.8
years. See THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 956 (George E. Delury ed.,
1979) (noting the number of years of life expected at birth). In 1998, when the
extension was enacted, life expectancy in the United States was about 76.7
years. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 2002 71, Table No. 91 (122d ed., 2002) (providing estimated life expec-
tancy for 1998).
487. Compare the facts to the statements submitted to Congress. In Stephen
Sondheim's statement, he maintained that the CTEA "reflect[ed] the reality
that life expectancy has increased by at least 20 years." S. Hearings, supra note
457, at 57. George Weiss, President of the Songwriters Guild of America, sug-
gested that "things have changed, even since the last term extension in 1976"
because authors are living longer and having children later in life. H Hearings
II, supra note 457, at 36.
488. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 305 (2000). Under the statute, copy-
rights expire at the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise ex-
pire. Thus, in some cases, surviving even a few minutes or hours longer result-
ing in death on January 1, will add an entire year to the copyright term. In
other cases living several months longer will not add any time to the copyright
term.
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of the work which the public domain provides.
A third problem with the argument that extension was
required to provide for an author and additional two genera-
tions is that the CTEA did not merely extend copyright terms
by twenty years for authors who create works-it also ex-
tended the term of copyrights for works made for hire.9
Works made for hire are those works "prepared by an em-
ployee within the scope of his or her employment," or certain
specially ordered or commissioned works which meet the re-
quirements of the Copyright Act.490 "Authors" of works made
for hire are often business entities or other collective groups
which have no families or future generations to support.491
The "life expectancy" of a business entity has no relevance to
the term of copyright. In other cases, individuals who did not
create the works may be considered "authors" of works made
for hire.4 9  These individuals are essentially purchasers or
consumers of copyrighted works. Copyright law does not and
should not look after these individuals' future generations.
The fairness argument is rooted in the property right
theory of copyrights. Witnesses and members of Congress ar-
gued that authors' interests in their works, in fairness, should
be treated like any other property. In the House Hearings,
Congressman Delahunt concluded that copyright extension
(along with other aspects of the House bill) boiled down to "a
question of fairness."493 He alleged that "[t]he overarching
premise of copyright law is that those who enrich our culture
with the fruits of their intellect are no less entitled to be com-
pensated than those who create more tangible products, be
they skyscrapers or computers or five-star meals." Others
echoed similar sentiments. The President and CEO of BMI
argued that "it seems only fair that the creators and owners
of intellectual property enjoy the same benefits from their
489. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §
102 (b)(3), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). The Act expanded the term from the earlier of
75 years from first publication or 100 years from its creation, to the earlier of 95
years from first publication or 120 years from its creation.
490. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work made for
hire").
491. See id. § 201 (b) (discussing ownership of copyrights for works made for
hire).
492. Id.
493. H. Hearings II, supra note 457, at 5.
494. Id.
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life's work as do other property owners. It is only fair that
their children and grandchildren should be able to enjoy the
fruits of their hard labor and sacrifice., 49" According to an-
other witness, Michael Weller, the Copyright Term Extension
Act was "about one thing: property."49 He compared copy-
right to a quilt left to you by your grandmother. The govern-
ment comes to your door and says "this quilt has been in your
family long enough, now it belongs to the world."
4 97
The property right theory of copyright helps explain the
comments of some that even the extension to "70 years after
death" was too short.9  Representative Sonny Bono, a strong
advocate for term extension and the namesake for the CTEA,
argued that copyrights should extend in perpetuity and be
treated like any other asset.4 " His wife and successor in Con-
gress, Representative Mary Bono, stated bluntly that:
Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last for-
ever. I am informed by staff that such a change would vio-
late the Constitution. ... As you know, there is also Jack
Valenti's proposal for term to last forever less one day.
Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress. 00
Harmonization with EU law, foreign trade, and private
property considerations are valid considerations for Congress,
495. Id. at 32 (statement of Frances W. Preston). For comments of other pro-
ponents, see S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 64-65 (prepared statement of
Shana Alexander) ("[I]t appears to me monstrously unfair that other recognized
forms of property-lands, businesses, and so on-can be handed down indefi-
nitely... whereas the value of intellectual property under our present copyright
laws arbitrarily is cut off 75 years after it was created."); id. at 65 (prepared
statement of E. Randol Schoenberg) (arguing "there does not seem to be any
sound reason for this disparity in the treatment of intellectual property from
other forms of property"); id. at 68 (excerpt from STYLE AND IDEA: SELECTED
WRITINGS OF ARNOLD SCHOENBERG 497 (Leonard Stein ed., 1949), questioning
in strong terms "why an author should be deprived of his property only for the
advantage of shameless pirates, while every other property could be inherited
by the most distant relative for centuries"); 144 CONG. REC. H1457 (daily ed.
Mar. 25, 1998) (statement of Rep. Doggett) ("Music is the property of the song-
writer who created it.").
496. H Hearings I, supra note 457, at 134 (statement of Michael Weller con-
cerning the Copyright Extension Act of 1995).
497. Id.
498. S Hearings, supra note 457, at 65 (statement of E. Randol Schoenberg);
see also H. Hearings I, supra note 457, at 230 (noting the existence of propo-
nents of perpetual copyright including the Songwriters Guild).
499. H. Hearings I, supra note 457, at 94 (statement of Rep. Bono) (arguing
that copyright should be treated like a house, a car, or a painting).
500. 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bono).
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but they should not be controlling in the area of copyright.
These considerations should be secondary to the public bene-
fit rationale of copyright identified by the Copyright Clause.
Unfortunately, Congress focused on these considerations, in-
fluenced by the property right rationale, at the expense of the
public benefit.
D. Incentive for Creation and Preservation of Works
The final justification offered in support of the CTEA was
the necessity of extension to stimulate the creation of new
works and preservation of existing, historical works. This ar-
gument has the correct focus. Unfortunately, the words ring
hollow. The Senate Report, and more generally Congress, in-
correctly assumed that term extension would stimulate the
creation of new works and create incentives to preserve exist-
ing works. Is it genuinely possible that an author would be
likely to create more works because those works would enjoy
copyright protection for the life of the author plus seventy
years rather than the life of the author plus fifty years? Such
a conclusion is incredible."1 Senator Hank Brown explained
the question well:
Do you know any creator that would fail to create if the
monopoly grant ran out at life-plus-50 years of protection
rather than life-plus-70 years? Would Hemingway have
produced another work if he were guaranteed another 20
years of copyright protection? Would Wyeth have painted
more? Would Sinata have sang more? This suggestion is
ludicrous.S52
Most people are concerned about supporting themselves
and their families now and in the foreseeable future, not
about enriching their descendants decades after their own
501. S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 71-72. Professor Peter Jaszi articulated
this position at the Senate hearings where he testified that "I cannot imagine
the instance in which a writer, for example, would be swayed to undertake a
project by the mere possibility of 20 more years of posthumous royalties avail-
able only in the highly unlikely event that the would retain popularity among
generations of readers yet unborn." Id. He also concluded that corporations
would be unlikely to be influenced by the addition of twenty years. Id. at 72.
Mary Beth Peters, Register of Copyright and a supporter of the CTEA, acknowl-
edged in her testimony that "it is difficult to see how moving from a term of life-
plus-50 to life-plus-70 will encourage authors to write." Id. at 6.
502. S. REPORT NO. 104-315 (minority views of Sen. Brown).
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deaths."' Even without extension, authors who are concerned
about leaving an inheritance for their descendants continue
to have a strong incentive to create in the same way that
salaried individuals have an incentive to work and accumu-
late wealth to pass on to descendents.
Lengthening the term of copyright creates little if any
added incentive, particularly considering that most authors
do not know the details of copyright terms. Several authors
who submitted testimony to Congress in the hearings in con-
nection with the CTEA indicated that they created their
works ignorant of the actual term of copyright protection.5°
One witness, George Weiss, President of the Songwriters
Guild of America, implicitly acknowledged that longer copy-
right term would not have made a difference to him in writing
particular works.0 5 Of course, no one could suggest otherwise
because all authors prior to the extension in fact did create
their works under a copyright regime that did not provide for
life plus seventy years; the shorter copyright terms prior to
the enactment of the CTEA provided sufficient incentive for
them to create.
Weiss posed a different argument. He suggested that
503. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 362 (1989) ("Income prospects that lie
twenty-five years in the future have little effect on present decisions, though not
zero since people do make provisions for retirement more than twenty-five years
in advance. The prospects of royalties in one hundred years, however, would
have no effect on most authors' incentives.").
504. Bob Dylan's prepared statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee
makes this point.
The impression given to me was that a composer's songs would re-
main in his or her family and that they would, one day, be the property
of the children and their children after them. It never occurred to me
that these songs would fall into the public domain while my children
are still in the prime of their lives, and while my grandchildren are still
teenagers or young adults.
S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 55; see also id. at 43 (statement of Alan Menken
that when he got into the songwriting business he never doubted that the law
"would secure [his] creations not only for [him] but for [his] children and their
children"); id. at 57 (statement of Carlos Santana that he believed his work
would give his children a secure base and that "[i]t never occurred to [him] that
because of the application of our copyright laws, [his] songs would not be suffi-
ciently protected").
505. H Hearings II, supra note 457, at 83. Rep. Coble asked the hypothetical
question of possible critics of extension: "Mr. Weiss, you yourself are a song-
writer, are you suggesting that you wouldn't have written those songs without a
life plus 70 copyright term? [Answer by] Mr. Weiss. No, I am not suggesting
that...."
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when young people choose their careers, they will consider
how they can best make a living for not only themselves, but
also for their spouse, children, and grandchildren, and "[if a
young person sees that the copyright laws of our country are
not protecting him and his children and grandchildren, he
may very well decide on a different profession. 50 The prob-
lem with this argument is that it is disconnected from reality.
How many young people who aspire to be writers or artists
make their career decisions based on the details of copyright
law protection? How many writers or practicing artists today
know the term of copyright protection their works enjoy?
Even if these young people do know the details of copyright
law protection, other factors dwarf any impact the copyright
term might have in making their career decisions. Their per-
sonal interests, life satisfaction, ability to pay their own bills,
and their probability for success are all considerations.0 7 In
all likelihood, most never get past consideration of the uphill
struggle of successfully making a living in the music or art
industries in their own lifetimes. These more pressing con-
cerns leave very little opportunity for aspiring authors to
ponder how their unborn grandchildren will possibly sur-
508
vive.
Nor does extension provide any incentive for the creation
of new works for corporations. Corporations, whose works
made for hire prior to extension enjoy seventy-five years of
copyright protection, need return on their works long before
the seventy-five years expire. Professor John Belton, on be-
half of The Society for Cinema Studies, testified at the House
hearings that corporations that produce motion pictures and
television programs "need to recoup their costs and make a
profit during their initial play-off, which runs from roughly
two to five years," any income beyond that is "pure gravy and
has little or no relation to the initial incentives which led to
its production."509
506. Id. at 83-84.
507. Edward P. Murphy testified to the harsh reality for songwriters and
publishers that "many works and the investments in those works never show a
profit," and "for every song that becomes a hit, hundreds, many more, go unno-
ticed." Id. at 76.
508. If we could ask 100 aspiring artists or authors what considerations they
are weighing in choosing their careers, I doubt that a single one would mention
their grandchildren or the term of copyright protection.
509. H Hearings I, supra note 457, at 286. Prof. Jaszi also explained: "No
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The other problem with the argument that people will be
discouraged from becoming authors (in the broad copyright
sense)"' is that the argument assumes that life plus fifty
years is an inadequate term of protection. At the subcommit-
tee hearings on term extension, Representative Coble, refer-
ring to Mr. Weiss's testimony, stated "[in your written testi-
mony, you argued convincingly that without term extension,
songwriters would have little or no incentive to create and
compose songs."' To the contrary; this argument should
have been anything but convincing. Songwriters created and
composed songs for thousands of years, long before the exis-
tence of any copyright protection. Without question, strong
copyright protection in the past two hundred plus years has
encouraged the creation of creative works, but a term for the
life of the author plus fifty years is strong copyright protec-
tion."' The records of the respective congressional hearings
are replete with statements of authors and others proclaim-
ing United States' dominance in the intellectual property in-
dustries; all of these authors created their works under prior
copyright law which afforded shorter copyright terms."3
The argument that a twenty-year extension of copyright
terms would create greater incentive to create new works
does not in any way justify the extension of the term for exist-
ing copyrights.514 Those authors already created their works
rational business makes economic decisions about present investment based on
the mere possibility of income 75 or 100 years in the future." S Hearings, supra
note 457, at 72.
510. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (defining broadly "works of
authorship").
511. H Hearings II, supra note 457, at 83.
512. Senator Brown understood this: "To suggest that the monopoly use of
copyrights for the creator's life plus 50 years after his death is not an adequate
incentive to create is absurd." S. REPORT NO. 104-315 (minority views of Sen.
Brown).
513. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, the term of an author's copyright was
twenty-eight years with the possibility of one twenty-eight-year renewal term.
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 471, § 8.1.1, at 149. Under the 1976 Act,
prior to extension, the term was the life of the author plus fifty years. Id. § 8.2,
at 153.
514. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1169 ("The retroactive extension of
the copyright term cannot possibly provide any incentive for Gershwin-or even
a living author-to create an already existing work."); Landes & Posner, supra
note 503, at 362 (noting that any increased incentive applies only to creation of
works not yet produced, and finding "a strong argument against making in-
creases in copyright term retroactive"); Marvin Ammori, Note, The Uneasy Case
for Copyright Extension, 16 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 287, 293 (2002) ("It seems fairly
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without any promise or indication of protection for a term of
life plus seventy years. Copyright term extension for existing
works was merely a windfall to current copyright owners-
who, in many cases, are not themselves the authors. On this
point, proponents of extension suggested that the extension of
existing copyrights would provide incentive to preserve, re-
store, and make available older works whose copyrights were
nearing expiration.' 5 This argument was accepted by the Su-
preme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft as providing a rational ba-
sis for the extension.' Mr. Valenti, before Congress, made
this impassioned plea:
Whatever work is not owned is a work that no one protects
and preserve[s]. The quality of the print is soon degraded.
There is no one who will invest the funds for enhancement
because there is no longer an incentive to rehabilitate and
preserve something that anyone can offer for sale. A pub-
lic domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its
life. But everyone exploits its use, until that time certain
when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its previous
virtues. How does a consumer benefit from the steady de-
cline of a film's quality?
'17
Consider Valenti's statement. Unowned works are not
preserved or protected. Libraries and museums all over the
world, chock full of copies... of works now in the public do-
main, testify to the literal falsity of this statement. The ma-
terial objects in which works are fixed continue to be owned
and preserved as property. In most cases this ownership in-
terest assures preservation of not only the material object but
also the work embodied in the object. If a person owns an
clear that retrospective copyrights cannot encourage innovation.").
515. See, e.g., S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 3 (statement of Sen. Hatch);
Hatch & Lee, supra note 9, at 16 (arguing that extension encouraged distribu-
tion and dissemination of copyrighted works). Senator Hatch and Professor Lee
argue that the encouragement of distribution and dissemination of existing
works satisfies the requirement that extension "promote the progress of sci-
ence." Id. But see L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno, An Example of the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 234 (2001) (finding
"[t]here is... no language in the Copyright Clause that empowers Congress to
grant a copyright for the preservation of works").
516. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 186 (1834).
517. S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 42 (prepared statement of Jack Valenti).
518. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). "Copies" takes the mean-
ing assigned by the Copyright Act. It means the material objects in which a
work is fixed, including the original material objects in which they are first
fixed. Id.
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original painting, regardless of whether he or she also owns
the accompanying copyright, that person will continue to own
the original painting after the copyright expires and have the
same incentive to preserve and protect it. Preservation of the
copy-in the Copyright Act sense of the word519-will insure
preservation of the work itself.
The same is true of a published book. Each owner of a
copy of a particular book continues to own the copy even after
the copyright expiration. The work is preserved in the copies
of the book. True, as interest in the book wanes some owners
of copies will neglect or destroy their copies, but others, now
freed of the constrains of copyright protection, will be able to
freely copy and preserve the work in a different medium or by
publication of new editions. 20
Even if copyright owners do have a diminished incentive
to protect or preserve works as the public domain approaches,
after expiration others will be freed to protect, preserve, and
use the works. This "orphan," no longer caged by a single
keeper, will grow up and may flourish. If there is still inter-
est in a work and a market for it, others are likely to pick up
the work and preserve it when the copyright expires. In fact,
that is the precise objection of many proponents of extension.
Speaking of a work in the public domain, Valenti stated: "But
everyone exploits its use, until that time certain when it be-
comes soiled and haggard, barren of its previous virtues. '2 '
How does public use of works in the public domain degrade or
devalue the works? This view is antithetical to the public
benefit rationale that for centuries has been the basis of
American copyright law.
Other witnesses at the hearings also questioned the
value of the public domain. 22 Allowing use of works and crea-
519. Id. (defining "copies" as material objects in which works is fixed, includ-
ing "the material object... in which the work is first fixed").
520. See Back to Basics: Old Is New Again, as Publishers (and Book Stores)
Push the Classics, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 12, 2003, at 49 (noting the
drive to publish new editions of the classics and noting the profitability of these
works because they are in the public domain and therefore are inexpensive to
publish).
521. S. Hearings, supra note 457, at 42.
522. See id. at 56 (statement of Don Henley, noting "the questionable real
value to the people of public domain material"); id. at 54 (statement of Alan
Menken, arguing "[w]hile the term 'public domain' implies that the ultimate
public, the consumer, will have free and easy access to creative works, this is
really not the case").
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tion of new derivative works based on previously copyrighted
works in no way devalues them. Instead, the use has the po-
tential to create new interest and new opportunities.
Copyright owners already have incentive to continue to
preserve and market profitable works even in the face of pos-
sible competition; they enjoy easy access to the work and have
a headstart in preparing and marketing it. On the other
hand, if there is not a market or interest in a work, even an
extended copyright will not save it. Why would a copyright
owner who was not already otherwise motivated to preserve a
work invest money in a work for which there is no market?
Anytime a copyright is about to expire, copyright owners
could make this same argument that a lengthened term
would encourage preservation and investment in existing
works. Accept this argument and there is no end to exten-
sion; copyrights will be perpetual.
VI. CONCLUSION
From the beginning of copyright protection, printers and
publishers have argued a property right rationale in support
of copyright protection. Later, authors took up the cause for
increased copyright protection, and more recently authors'
children and grandchildren have joined in the cause. But the
public benefit rationale for copyright protection enjoys an
equally long pedigree. The early privileges obtained in Venice
were concerned primarily with the rights of printers. These
printers did not rely upon natural rights of authors, but they
did make fairness and public interest arguments. Later,
members of the Stationers' Company-usually booksellers
and printers, but not authors-controlled copyrights in Eng-
land and claimed to act in the public interest. As hostility to
the Stationers' monopolistic powers grew, the Stationers be-
gan to tie their interests to the purported natural rights of
authors. The Statute of Anne elevated the interests of au-
thors by extending copyright ownership to them. Although
the Statute of Anne demonstrated concern for authors, it had
an unmistakable public benefit focus.
Throughout the history of copyright law, supporters of
the natural law property right view and supporters of the
public benefit view have competed to control the course of
copyright protection. In the United States, the Constitution
embraced the public benefit rationale. The courts generally
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have construed American copyright law in light of this ra-
tionale.
The original purposes of copyright protection identified in
the Constitution and inherited from the Statute of Anne,
however, are not served by the CTEA. The passage of the
CTEA signaled a troubling shift away from the public benefit
rationale. Congress, enticed by calls of "harmonization" with
EU law, a continued "healthy surplus balance of trade" in
copyrighted works, and "fairness" allowed the private inter-
ests of a few copyright holders to eclipse the interest of the
general public.2' The arguments in support of the CTEA dis-
counted the benefits of the public domain and the expense to
American consumers of copyrighted works.
Advocates of the public domain need to be heard. The
owners of valuable copyrights are well-organized, well-
funded, and strongly motivated to influence the direction of
copyright law, and Congress has responded to them."4 As a
result, members of the public will pay more than they should
for certain works and have limited use of works which other-
wise would have passed into the public domain. Owners of
extended copyrights will potentially collect royalties and oth-
erwise continue to control their works. The creation of de-
rivative works will be impeded and the use of works under ex-
tended copyrights will be limited. In short, works under
extended copyrights will remain secure, free from the threat
of being freely used by other authors, scholars, and everyday
people.
The CTEA is now law, and there is no chance that Con-
gress will reconsider this extension.525 The Supreme Court in
Eldred v. Ashcroft made clear that it will not intervene and
invalidate the CTEA."2 ' Nonetheless, advocates of the public
benefit rationale need to be vigilant as Congress considers fu-
523. See Patterson, supra note 515, at 240 (noting that "[t]he CTEA... is in
the tradition of publishers seeking to enhance their monopoly").
524. See Ammori, supra note 514, at 293 (noting efforts of Disney and pub-
lishing interests against weaker coalition of opponents).
525. The CTEA enjoyed broad bipartisan support. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC.
S11673 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy, commending the bi-
partisan cooperation on the bill); 144 CONG. REC. H1463 (daily ed. Mar. 25,
1998) (remarks of Rep. Gallegly noting that "extension has enjoyed strong bi-
partisan backing and is supported by a wide-ranging coalition").
526. This article does not take a position on the merits of the holding in El-
dred. Instead, it argues that Congress made a poor policy decision not in har-
mony with the historical purposes of copyright law.
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ture copyright legislation. Almost certainly, those who hold
the property right view will continue their efforts to achieve
perpetual copyright. However, as Congress struggles with
new issues posed by digital technology including peer-to-peer
file sharing, computer software copying, encryption (and de-
cryption) of DVDs, and educational uses of emerging tech-
nologies, Congress should view proposals through the lens of
the public benefit rationale. Champions of the public benefit
rationale should push Congress back in the direction of the
public benefit and should also attempt to educate the public
about the interests at stake.
The debate will not always pit advocates of the public
benefit rationale against copyright holders. The public bene-
fit rationale requires strong and appropriate copyright protec-
tion to encourage creation of works, but it also recognizes the
need for limits to those protections both in duration and in
scope. Without the proper focus and balance, however, copy-
right owners risk alienating a public full of consumers of
copyrighted works much as the Stationers' Company did with
its monopoly powers centuries ago. The result could be a
backlash leading to disregard for copyright law or an under-
mining of necessary aspects of copyright protection.52
527. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 701 (expressing fear that exten-
sion may promote efforts "to cut back on the scope of copyright" to offset exces-
sive copyright terms).
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